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The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and 
the False Dichotomy Between Protecting National 
Security and Preserving Grand Jury Secrecy 
Lori E. Shaw∗ 
On September 11, 2001, thousands of lives were lost, buildings 
were demolished, and our nation’s democratic institutions were 
shaken to their core.  One such institution, the federal grand jury, 
continues to feel the reverberations from that day.  The doctrine of 
grand jury secrecy, enshrined under the common law and 
subsequently codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) 
(“Rule 6(e)”), faces perhaps the most serious threat in its history. 
In response to the continuing danger posed by terrorism, 
Congress has amended Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) to 
create unprecedented exceptions to the rule that matters before a 
federal grand jury must not be disclosed.1  As part of a much larger 
plan to encourage the sharing of information by law enforcement 
and intelligence officials,2 a new exception to Rule 6(e) created by 
the USA PATRIOT Act of 20013 (“Patriot Act”) facilitates the sharing 
of grand jury materials relating to intelligence matters with federal 
intelligence, immigration, defense, protective, and security officials.4  
To further address the threat, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 20045 added a second exception to Rule 6(e): 
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 1 See infra Part I.C. 
 2 See infra notes 114–35 and accompanying text. 
 3 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and in scattered sections 
of 18, 22, 28 and 50 U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter Patriot Act]. 
 4 Patriot Act § 203(a), 115 Stat. at 278–80 (codified as amended at FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 6(e)(3)); see infra notes 94–188 and accompanying text. 
 5 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
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Grand jury materials relating to threats to national security (such as 
terrorism and sabotage) may be disclosed to a wide-ranging group of 
officials, including foreign officials.6  Neither of the new exceptions, 
however, requires judicial approval of disclosures or a showing of 
particularized need.  Constitutional challenges are almost certain.7 
Notably, unlike many other provisions of the Patriot Act and 
some other provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act, these provisions do not contain a sunset rule.8  In 
other words, these are not wartime security measures; rather, the 
changes are permanent.  Accordingly, Congress is obligated to revisit 
these hastily crafted policy decisions made against the backdrop of a 
national security crisis. 
Part I of this Article describes the history of grand jury secrecy 
within the United States from its common-law beginnings to the most 
recent amendments to Rule 6(e).  Examining the relationship 
between the right of grand jury secrecy and the Grand Jury Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, Part II concludes that the right of grand jury 
secrecy enjoys constitutional protection.  Part III then determines 
that the newly created exceptions to Rule 6(e) are, at best, poor 
public policy and, at worst, violations of the Grand Jury Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.  Finally, Part IV proposes an amendment to Rule 
6(e) that would preserve a right valued for nearly a millennium and 
bring the new exceptions within constitutional limits without 
sacrificing national security interests. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF GRAND JURY SECRECY IN THE UNITED STATES 
The history of grand jury secrecy within the United States can be 
 
458, 118 Stat. 3638 (to be codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and in scattered sections of 
U.S.C.). 
 6 Id. § 6501(a), 18 Stat. at 3760 (codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)); see infra notes 
188–198 and accompanying text. 
 7 See Frederick P. Hitz, Unleashing the Rogue Elephant: September 11 and Letting the 
CIA Be the CIA, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 765, 773 (2002). 
 8 The Patriot Act contains a sunset provision that makes the Act ineffective as of 
December 31, 2005.  Patriot Act § 224(a), 115 Stat. at 295 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
2510 note (Supp. I 2001)).  However, the sunset provision specifically exempts 
section 203(a), which amended Rule 6(e).  Id.  The Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 contains sunset rules for a few provisions, though 
not the provisions which amend Rule 6(e).  See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act § 6603(g), 118 Stat. at 3764 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
2332b).  The proposed PATRIOT Oversight Restoration Act, S. 1695, 108th Cong. 
(2003), would extend the Patriot Act’s sunset provision to include section 203(a); see 
also 149 CONG. REC. S12284 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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divided into three distinct eras: the common-law era, the pre-
September 11th rules era, and the post-September 11th rules era. 
A. The Common-Law Era 
“[O]lder than our Nation itself,”9 the right to indictment by a 
grand jury journeyed to the New World with the English colonists.10  
In the United States, as in England, “the grand jury has convened as a 
body of laymen, free from technical rules, acting in secret . . . .”11  For 
centuries, the common law protected grand jury secrecy.12 
To understand the reasons for secrecy, one must understand the 
role of the grand jury proceeding.  Grand jury proceedings have 
traditionally served two functions: investigating whether there is 
probable cause that a crime has occurred (i.e., the “sword” or 
“investigatory” function)13 and screening cases to shield innocent 
persons from unwarranted prosecution (i.e., the “shield” or 
“screening” function).14  Thus, grand juries serve both the 
governmental interest in finding and punishing wrongdoers and the 
individual interest in avoiding the indiscriminate exercise of 
governmental authority.15  Although the grand jury was created to 
serve the investigatory function,16 by the seventeenth century, the 
screening function had risen to prominence.17  Indeed, the screening 
 
 9 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959). 
 10 See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956); Mark Kadish, Behind the 
Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1, 5–16 (1996).  The first regular American grand jury sat in the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1635.  RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE 
GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1631–1941, at 6 (1963). 
 11 Costello, 350 U.S. at 362.  In the early English criminal courts, “if a grand juror 
disclosed to a person accused the evidence before the grand jury in his case, such 
grand juror became accessory to the crime, if it was a felony, and a principal, if it was 
treason . . . .”  In re Atwell, 140 F. 368, 370 (W.D.N.C. 1905), rev’d, Atwell v. United 
States, 162 F. 97 (4th Cir. 1908).  In American courts, disclosure was punished with 
contempt proceedings.  Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 
1939). 
 12 See, e.g., Goodman, 108 F.2d at 520 (holding that despite lack of statute or rule 
requiring grand jurors or grand jury witnesses to take oath of secrecy, such was 
within discretionary power of courts).  American courts often required grand jurors 
and witnesses to take an oath of secrecy.  Id. at 518–19. 
 13 SUSAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G. LOCKHART, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE § 
3.1 (1996). 
 14 Id. § 2.2. 
 15 Id. 
 16 YOUNGER, supra note 10, at 1. 
 17 “[U]nlike its English progenitor, the American grand jury originally began, not 
  
498 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:495 
 
 
function was viewed by the nation’s founders as being of such 
consequence18 that it was incorporated into the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.19 
Given the functions the grand jury served, the necessity of 
conducting its proceedings in private was obvious.20  Long before the 
discovery of the New World, grand jurors were required to take an 
oath of secrecy.21  Prior to the War of Independence, governmental 
representatives were barred from jury deliberations.22  In 1681, John 
Somers, a noted scholar read on both sides of the Atlantic, outlined 
three reasons why secret proceedings serve the public good.23  If 
targets were aware of the grand jury proceedings, they might conspire 
to “hide their crimes,”24  or they might flee.25  Either of these events 
would impede the investigatory function.  Also, questioning witnesses 
privately and separately helps uncover the truth,26 a goal vital to both 
the innocent target27 (i.e., the screening function) and the King28 
 
as an arm of the executive, but as a defense against monarchy.  It established a screen 
between accusations and convictions and initiated prosecutions of corrupt agents of 
the government.”  Kadish, supra note 10, at 10. 
 18 See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (“Historically, this body has 
been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and 
oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing 
between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority 
group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was 
dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.”). 
 19 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see infra Part II.  By the end of the Revolutionary War, 
“indictment by a grand jury had assumed the position of a cherished right.”  
YOUNGER, supra note 10, at 41. 
 20 For a more detailed explanation of the interests protected by grand jury 
secrecy see infra Part II.C. 
 21 Kadish, supra note 10, at 13. 
 22 Id. 
 23 JOHN SOMERS, THE SECURITY OF ENGLISH-MEN’S LIVES, OR THE TRUST, POWER, 
AND DUTY OF THE GRAND JURYS OF ENGLAND 44–55 (photo. reprint 1979) (1681). 
 24 Id. at 44. 
 25 Id. at 46. 
 26 See id. at 46–47 (“Yet the reason will be still more manifest for keeping secret 
the accusations and the Evidence by the Grand Inquest if it be well considered, how 
useful and necessary it is for discovering truth in the Examinations of Witnesses in 
many, if not most cases that may come before them; when if by this Privacy Witnesses 
may be examined in such manner and Order, as prudence and occasion direct; and 
no one of them be suffered to know who hath been examined before him, nor what 
questions have been asked him, nor what answers he hath given, it may probably be 
found out whether a Witness hath been biassed [sic] in his Testimony by Malice or 
Revenge, or the fear or favour of men in Power, or the love or hopes of Lucre and 
gain in present or future, or Promises of impunity for some enormous Crime.”). 
 27 Id. at 49–52. 
  
2005 PRESERVING GRAND JURY SECRECY 499 
 
 
(i.e., the investigatory function). 
Under the common law, the right of grand jury secrecy was 
qualified: It could be overcome upon a showing that disclosure was 
“essential to the enforcement of the constitutional guaranties or to 
the protection, preservation, or enforcement of public or private 
rights.”29  The standard applied was stringent.  Absent a showing of 
substantial need, matters occurring before a grand jury were almost 
never subject to disclosure.30  A majority of the reported cases 
involved requests for disclosure by defendants seeking to contest an 
indictment,31 but disclosure was also sought by government attorneys 
desiring to use grand jury materials at trial32 and in other 
 
 28 Id. at 53–55. 
 29 McKinney v. United States, 199 F. 25, 38 (8th Cir. 1912) (Sanborn, J., 
dissenting). 
 30 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940) 
(“[A]fter the grand jury’s functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the 
ends of justice require it.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Terry 39 F. 355, 
356 (N.D. Cal. 1889) (stating that “general rules or doctrines must in some cases give 
way; but exceptions to their application must be admitted with extreme caution, and 
on the clearest ground of their necessity, to secure substantial, and not merely 
technical, rights”); United States v. Farrington, 5 F. 343, 347 (N.D.N.Y. 1881) (“The 
rule which may be adduced from the authorities, and which seems most consistent 
with the policy of the law, is that whenever it becomes essential to ascertain what has 
transpired before a grand jury it may be shown, no matter by whom; and the only 
limitation is that it may not be shown how the individual jurors voted or what they 
said during their investigations, because this cannot serve any of the purposes of 
justice.”) (citations omitted).  Departing from the rule of secrecy, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Atwell held that once the grand jury has 
issued an indictment and been discharged and the defendant has been taken into 
custody, grand jurors are no longer bound by an oath of secrecy.  Atwell v. United 
States, 162 F. 97, 102–03 (4th Cir. 1908).  The idea that the need for secrecy 
diminishes after the grand jury has completed its work gained some acceptance.  See, 
e.g., Metzler v. United States, 64 F.2d 203, 206 (9th Cir. 1933).  In the years following 
the Metzler decision, however, the Ninth Circuit’s holding that no requirement of 
secrecy remains “seems to have made but slight impression upon the federal courts 
in disposing of many kindred questions.”  United States v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 26 F. 
Supp. 429, 430 (D.D.C. 1939). 
 31 See, e.g., Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1941) 
(upholding trial court’s denial of defendants’ plea to review sufficiency of evidence 
before grand jury); United States v. Cent. Supply Ass’n, 34 F. Supp. 241, 242–46 
(N.D. Ohio 1940) (overruling defendants’ motion to release grand jury witnesses 
from their oath of secrecy to allow defendants to prepare for trial); Am. Med. Ass’n, 
26 F. Supp. at 429–31 (granting government’s motion to strike defendant’s motion 
to elicit information from grand jurors relating to possible prosecutorial 
misconduct); United States v. Perlman, 247 F. 158, 161–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (denying 
defendant’s motion to quash indictment and concluding insufficient reason existed 
to warrant inspection of grand jury minutes by court or defendant). 
 32 See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 233 (concluding that “use of grand 
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proceedings.33  Disclosure was permitted in only a handful of 
reported decisions.34 
Persons seeking disclosure bore the burden of showing a 
particularized need for disclosure, such that vague generalities did 
not suffice.35  For example, grand jury secrecy was “not to be set aside 
on every request or suggestion of the person indicted, but only when 
there [was a] probability of serious illegality.”36  Further, the court 
had the duty to determine if and when some other need outweighed 
the need for secrecy.37  Not taken lightly, breaching secrecy could 
 
jury testimony for the purpose of refreshing the recollection of a witness rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial judge”). 
 33 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 283–85 (E.D. Pa. 1933) 
(permitting grand jury testimony in beer permit revocation proceeding); United 
States v. Cobban, 127 F. 713, 721–22 (D. Mont. 1904) (permitting examination of 
grand jurors to determine if prosecutorial misconduct tainted grand jury 
proceeding). 
 34 See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 231–34 (permitting court-authorized 
disclosure because “necessary or appropriate” for refreshing recollection of witness at 
trial); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. at 283–85; Farrington, 5 F. at 343–48 
(recognizing right of court to remove veil of secrecy to investigate prosecutorial 
misconduct before grand jury). 
 35 See, e.g., Shushan, 117 F.2d at 113 (finding evidence that grand jury was not 
presented direct testimony on particular element was insufficient to justify reviewing 
record of proceedings because element may have been established using 
circumstantial evidence); Am. Med. Assn., 26 F. Supp. at 429–31 (refusing to review 
grand jury record based on affidavit of defense counsel that “he has been ‘informed’ 
by various defendants and ‘believes’ that attorneys for the government presented 
irrelevant testimony to the grand jury, advised it as to the law, and requested and 
persuaded it to return the indictment”). 
 36 Shushan, 117 F.2d at 113; accord Perlman, 247 F. at 161 (noting judge’s right to 
inspect grand jury minutes “should be sparingly exercised, unless a strong case is 
made out requiring examination of the minutes in the furtherance of justice, or for 
the protection of individual rights”). 
 37 See, e.g., Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1940) (“Logically, 
the responsibility for relaxing the rule of secrecy and of supervising any subsequent 
inquiry should reside in the court, of which the grand jury is a part and under the 
general instructions of which it conducted its judicial inquiry.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1939) 
(holding that “the court may at any time in the furtherance of justice remove the seal 
of privacy from grand jury proceedings”); United States v. Cent. Supply Ass’n, 34 F. 
Supp. 241, 243 (N.D. Ohio 1940) (“We also know that from earliest times the veil of 
secrecy was cast over the deliberations of the grand jury and they were not called 
upon to disclose what occurred during their deliberations except in a judicial inquiry 
directed by the court.”); Am. Med. Ass’n., 26 F. Supp. at 430 (finding that only court 
could release grand jurors from their oath of secrecy).  But see Atwell v. United States, 
162 F. 97, 101 (4th Cir. 1908) (ruling that grand jurors were not bound to oath of 
secrecy “after presentment and indictment found, made public, and custody of the 
accused had, and the grand jury finally discharged”). 
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result in prosecution for criminal contempt.38  These basic policies 
continued with the adoption of Rule 6(e), which is discussed in the 
following sections. 
B.   Rule 6(e) Prior to September 11th 
Prior to the events of September 11th, both the text of Rule 6(e) 
and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the rule reflected “the 
orthodox view that all proceedings before the Grand Jury should 
remain secret unless extraordinary circumstances are present.”39 
1. The Text of Rule 6(e) 
Adoption of Rule 6(e) in 1944 codified the common-law 
doctrine of grand jury secrecy.  Rule 6(e) stated: 
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than 
its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the 
attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their 
duties.  Otherwise, a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer 
may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when 
so directed by the court preliminary to or in connection with a 
judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request 
of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a 
motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring 
before the grand jury.40 
Despite the absence of an express provision permitting contempt as a 
remedy for unauthorized disclosure, the courts continued to view 
contempt as the proper sanction for persons who removed the veil of 
secrecy.41 
 
 38 Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1556–57 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing In re 
Summerhayes, 70 F. 769, 773–74 (N.D. Cal. 1895)). 
 39 United States v. Papaioanu, 10 F.R.D. 517, 518 (D. Del. 1950). 
 40 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (1976) (amended 1977). 
 41 See, e.g., United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 43 (6th Cir. 1965) (identifying 
contempt as proper sanction for unauthorized disclosure); United States v. Schiavo, 
375 F. Supp. 475, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (noting that proper sanction for unauthorized 
disclosure is a contempt proceeding); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 
293 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (concluding that court has inherent power to “discipline the 
attorneys, the attendants or the grand jurors themselves for breach of the secrecy 
surrounding the body”).  This practice was consistent with the rulemakers’ intent as 
expressed in the notes accompanying the early drafts of the rule.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 
advisory committee’s note (Second Preliminary Draft 1944) (“Violation of the rule 
renders such persons liable to contempt proceedings.”), reprinted in 4 DRAFTING 
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 20 (Madeleine J. Wilken & 
Nicholas Triffin eds., 1991) [hereinafter DRAFTING HISTORY]. 
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According to the Advisory Committee, the new rule 
“continue[d] the traditional practice of secrecy on the part of 
members of the grand jury, except when the court permits a 
disclosure.”42  Rulemakers never questioned the continuance of this 
practice.  From the preliminary draft, grand jury secrecy was part and 
parcel of the criminal rules.43  In the notes accompanying the early 
drafts of the rule,44 the Committee specifically pointed to the 
justifications for secrecy set forth in United States v. Providence Tribune 
Co.,45 which warned: 
Secrecy is essential to the proceedings of a grand jury for many 
reasons.  Publicity may defeat justice by warning offenders to 
escape, to destroy evidence, or to tamper with witnesses . . . .  
Secrecy is also required in order that the reputations of innocent 
persons may not suffer from the fact that their conduct is under 
investigation, or has been investigated, by a grand jury . . . .  
Secrecy is further required for the protection of witnesses who 
may go before the grand jury, and to encourage them to make 
full disclosure of their knowledge of subjects and persons under 
investigation, without fear of evil consequences to themselves.46 
The phrase “matters occurring before the grand jury” has been 
interpreted to protect a wide variety of materials.47 
[It] includes not only what has occurred and what is occurring, 
but also what is likely to occur.  Encompassed within the rule of 
secrecy are “the identities of witnesses or jurors, the substance of 
testimony” as well as actual transcripts, “the strategy or direction 
of the investigation, the deliberations or questions of jurors, and 
the like.”48 
Among other things, grand jury records and transcripts are 
protected,49 as are witness testimony50 and reports that summarize or 
 
 42 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 advisory committee’s note; accord United States v. Sells 
Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 (1983). 
 43 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) (Advisory Committee’s unpublished preliminary draft 
1942), reprinted in 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 41, at 50. 
 44 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 advisory committee’s note (Second Preliminary Draft 
1944), reprinted in 4 DRAFTING HISTORY supra note 41, at 16–22. 
 45 241 F. 524 (D.R.I. 1917). 
 46 Id. at 526 (citations omitted). 
 47 See generally BRENNER & LOCKHART, supra note 13, § 8.4. 
 48 In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting 
SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc); Fund for 
Constitutional Gov’t v. Nat’l Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 869 (D.C. Cir. 
1981)). 
 49 BRENNER & LOCKHART, supra note 13, § 8.4.1. 
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analyze materials presented to the grand jury.51  The goal is to prevent 
the disclosure of “anything which may reveal what occurred before 
the grand jury.”52 
Under the original Rule 6(e), the sole exception to the 
requirement of judicial approval involved disclosure to “attorneys for 
the government for use in the performance of their duties.”53  Given 
that it was intended to allow disclosure to persons who were already 
entitled to be present in the grand jury room, this exception (the 
“government-attorney exception”) was entirely consistent with the 
doctrine of grand jury secrecy.54 
In 1977, Rule 6(e) was amended to allow disclosure without 
judicial approval to “such government personnel . . . as are deemed 
necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney for 
the government in the performance of such attorney’s duty to 
enforce Federal criminal law.”55  Rulemakers justified the disclosure 
based on government attorneys’ inability to adequately conduct 
grand jury investigations in the absence of additional government 
personnel.56  In a sense, the government personnel are merely 
extensions of the government attorney.57  Under this exception (the 
“law enforcement exception”), such personnel are only permitted to 
use grand jury materials to assist the attorney in enforcing federal 
criminal law.58  Any knowing violation of this secrecy obligation may 
be considered a contempt of court.59  Furthermore, the government 
attorney is required to promptly notify the court of any disclosure 
and to specify the government personnel to whom disclosure was 
made.60  The 1977 amendment also expressly provided for the 
 
 50 Id. § 8.4.2. 
 51 Id. § 8.4.3. 
 52 In re Grand Jury Matter, 682 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 53 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (1976) (amended 1977). 
 54 The original advisory committee note to the 1944 version of Rule 6(e) states 
that “[g]overnment attorneys are entitled to disclosure of grand jury proceedings, 
other than the deliberations and the votes of the jurors, inasmuch as they may be 
present in the grand jury room during the presentation of evidence.”  FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 6 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 7 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 41, at 243. 
 55 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (2001) (amended 2002). 
 56 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 advisory committee’s note (1977 amendments). 
 57 See S. REP. NO. 95-354, at 6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 530 
(“Attorneys for the Government in the performance of their duties with a grand jury 
must possess the authority to utilize the services of other government employees.”).  
 58 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(B). 
 59 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(7). 
 60 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(B). 
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sanction of contempt for the unauthorized disclosure of grand jury 
materials.61  In part, this provision was intended to “allay the concerns 
of those who fear that such prosecutorial power will lead to misuse of 
the grand jury to enforce non-criminal Federal laws.”62 
In 1983, Rule 6(e) was amended to permit government attorneys 
to share grand jury materials with other federal grand juries.63  Again, 
this exception (the “grand-juror exception”) is not inconsistent with 
the doctrine of grand jury secrecy: Grand jurors to whom the 
information is disclosed are bound by their oaths of secrecy.64  Finally, 
in 1985, Rule 6(e) was amended to clarify that state and local 
government personnel are included within the definition of 
government personnel to whom disclosure by a government attorney 
is permitted.65  To further safeguard grand jury secrecy, rulemakers 
required the government attorney making the disclosure to warn the 
government personnel (federal, state, or local) of the obligation of 
secrecy.66 
2. United States v. Sells Engineering: A Narrow 
Interpretation 
The United States Supreme Court provided perhaps the most 
significant interpretation of Rule 6(e) in United States v. Sells 
Engineering, Inc.67  The Court was asked to determine whether 
government attorneys working for the Civil Division of the Justice 
Department could access grand jury materials for the purpose of 
preparing a civil suit.68  The Government argued that, since the 
attorneys for the Civil Division fell within the category of “attorneys 
for the government,” such materials could automatically be disclosed 
pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i), the government-attorney exception.69  
Despite agreeing that Civil Division attorneys fell within that class,70 
 
 61 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (2001) (amended 2002) (“A knowing violation of Rule 
6 may be punished as a contempt of court.”) (current version at FED. R. CRIM. P. 
6(e)(7)). 
 62 S. REP. NO. 95-354, at 8 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 531. 
 63 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii) (2000) (amended 2001) (current version at 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)). 
 64 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 advisory committee’s note (1983 amendments). 
 65 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (2001) (amended 2002). 
 66 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(B). 
 67 463 U.S. 418 (1983). 
 68 Id. at 420. 
 69 Id. at 427. 
 70 Id. at 427–28 (noting that “Rule 54(c) defines the phrase expansively, to 
  
2005 PRESERVING GRAND JURY SECRECY 505 
 
 
the Court concluded that the Government was not entitled to 
automatic disclosure.71  Specifically, the Court explained that “[t]he 
policies of Rule 6 require that any disclosure to attorneys other than 
prosecutors be judicially supervised rather than automatic.”72 
The Court, narrowly interpreting the exception, found that the 
government-attorney exception only permits disclosure “in the 
performance of such attorney’s duty.”73  In so doing, the Court ruled 
that “preparation and litigation of a civil suit by a Justice Department 
attorney who had no part in conducting the related criminal 
prosecution” does not fall within that category of duties covered by 
the exception.74  Driven by “the strong historic policy of preserving 
grand jury secrecy,”75 the Court found “disclosure for civil use 
unjustified by the considerations supporting prosecutorial access.”76  
In other words, the Court ruled that grand juries may function 
perfectly well without such disclosure.77 
The Court’s analysis, however, did not conclude with this 
finding.  Greatly concerned that broad disclosure would increase “the 
risk of inadvertent or illegal release to others” and “render[] 
considerably more concrete the threat to the willingness of witnesses 
to come forward and to testify fully and candidly,”78 the Court took 
great pains to articulate the “affirmative mischief” such disclosure 
could cause.79  Moreover, the Court expressed concern for “the 
integrity of the grand jury itself,” fearing that the institution might be 
used for purposes other than criminal investigation and that such 
misuse might be difficult to ascertain.80 
 
include ‘authorized assistants of the Attorney General’” (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 54 
(1982) (currently as amended at FED. R. CRIM. P. 1(b)(1)(A)))).  The Attorney 
General may direct any Justice Department attorney to conduct “any kind of legal 
proceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 
515(a) (2000). 
 71 Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 435. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 428. 
 74 Id. at 428–35. 
 75 Id. at 428. 
 76 Id. at 431. 
 77 Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 431. 
 78 Id. at 432. 
 79 Id. at 431. 
 80 Id. at 432–33.  A third concern was that the “use of grand jury materials by 
government agencies in civil or administrative settings threatens to subvert the 
limitations applied outside the grand jury context on the Government’s powers of 
discovery and investigation.” Id. at 433. 
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The Government also sought disclosure under then-Rule 
6(e)(3)(C)(i),81 which permitted court-ordered disclosure 
“preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.”82  In 
doing so, the Government attempted to distinguish between cases 
involving disclosure to government officials and those involving 
disclosure to private parties.83  When government officials seek 
disclosure “in furtherance of their responsibility to protect the public 
weal,” the Government argued, those officials should not be required 
to demonstrate particularized need.84  At the heart of this argument 
lies the notion that “disclosure of grand jury materials to government 
attorneys typically implicates few, if any, of the concerns that underlie 
the policy of grand jury secrecy.”85  While acknowledging that the 
Government’s contention had “some validity,” the Court found the 
argument “overstated.”86  As a result, the Court refused to waive 
application of the particularized-need standard to government 
officials.87 
Thus, prior to September 11th, the only persons to whom grand 
jury materials could be disclosed without prior judicial approval were 
government attorneys involved in federal criminal investigations, 
government personnel assisting government attorneys in federal 
criminal investigations, and federal grand jurors.  Each of these 
groups is essential to the functioning of a federal grand jury, and 
each has an obligation of secrecy under Rule 6(e)(2).88  All others 
 
 81 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I) (2001) (amended 2002) (currently at FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i)). 
 82 Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 442 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 443 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Specifically, the Government 
sought to avoid the application of the standard articulated in Douglas Oil Co. of 
California v. Petrol Stops Northwest: 
Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show that 
the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another 
judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the 
need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to 
cover only material so needed . . . . 
Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 443 (quoting Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 
441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 85 Id. at 444–45. 
 86 Id. at 445. 
 87 Id. at 444–45 (noting, however, that “the standard itself accommodates any 
relevant considerations, peculiar to Government movants, that weigh for or against 
disclosure in a given case”). 
 88 On September 11, 2001, Rule 6(e) read: 
(e) Recording and Disclosure of Proceedings. 
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 (1) Recording of Proceedings.  All proceedings, except when the grand 
jury is deliberating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by 
an electronic recording device.  An unintentional failure of any 
recording to reproduce all or any portion of a proceeding shall not 
affect the validity of the prosecution.  The recording or reporter’s 
notes or any transcript prepared therefrom shall remain in the custody 
or control of the attorney for the government unless otherwise ordered 
by the court in a particular case. 
 (2) General Rule of Secrecy.  A grand juror, an interpreter, a 
stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who 
transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any 
person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this 
subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, 
except as otherwise provided for in these rules.  No obligation of 
secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this 
rule.  A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of 
court. 
 (3) Exceptions. 
   (A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters 
occurring before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the 
vote of any grand juror, may be made to— 
 (i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance 
of such attorney’s duty; and 
 (ii) such government personnel (including personnel of a state 
or subdivision of a state) as are deemed necessary by an attorney for 
the government to assist an attorney for the government in the 
performance of such attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law. 
 (B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under 
subparagraph (A)(ii) of this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury 
material for any purpose other than assisting the attorney for the 
government in the performance of such attorney’s duty to enforce 
federal criminal law.  An attorney for the government shall promptly 
provide the district court, before which was impaneled the grand jury 
whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to 
whom such disclosure has been made, and shall certify that the 
attorney has advised such persons of their obligation of secrecy under 
this rule. 
 (C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters 
occurring before the grand jury may also be made— 
 (i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection 
with a judicial proceeding; 
 (ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, 
upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the 
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury; 
 (iii) when the disclosure is made by an attorney for the 
government to another federal grand jury; or 
 (iv) when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for 
the government, upon a showing that such matters may disclose a 
violation of state criminal law, to an appropriate official of a state or 
subdivision of a state for the purpose of enforcing such law. 
 If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the 
grand jury, the disclosure shall be made in such manner, at such time, 
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seeking disclosure, including government officials, were required to 
obtain judicial approval by demonstrating particularized need.89 
C. Rule 6(e) After September 11th 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed lives and 
laws.  Within fifteen months after the attacks, Congress had enacted 
two massive pieces of legislation aimed at addressing the terrorist 
 
and under such conditions as the court may direct. 
 (D) A petition for disclosure pursuant to subdivision (e)(3)(C)(i) 
shall be filed in the district where the grand jury convened.  Unless the 
hearing is ex parte, which it may be when the petitioner is the 
government, the petitioner shall serve written notice of the petition 
upon (i) the attorney for the government, (ii) the parties to the 
judicial proceeding if disclosure is sought in connection with such a 
proceeding, and (iii) such other persons as the court may direct.  The 
court shall afford those persons a reasonable opportunity to appear 
and be heard. 
 (E) If the judicial proceeding giving rise to the petition is in a 
federal district court in another district, the court shall transfer the 
matter to that court unless it can reasonably obtain sufficient 
knowledge of the proceeding to determine whether disclosure is 
proper.  The court shall order transmitted to the court to which the 
matter is transferred the material sought to be disclosed, if feasible, 
and a written evaluation of the need for continued grand jury secrecy.  
The court to which the matter is transferred shall afford the 
aforementioned persons a reasonable opportunity to appear and be 
heard. 
 (4) Sealed Indictments.  The federal magistrate judge to whom an 
indictment is returned may direct that the indictment be kept secret 
until the defendant is in custody or has been released pending trial.  
Thereupon the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shall 
disclose the return of the indictment except when necessary for the 
issuance and execution of a warrant or summons. 
 (5) Closed Hearing.  Subject to any right to an open hearing in 
contempt proceedings, the court shall order a hearing on matters 
affecting a grand jury proceeding to be closed to the extent necessary 
to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury. 
 (6) Sealed Records.  Records, orders and subpoenas relating to grand 
jury proceedings shall be kept under seal to the extent and for such 
time as is necessary to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a 
grand jury. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (2000) (amended Oct. 26, 2001). 
 89 The requirement that a person seeking disclosure of grand jury materials 
establish a “particularized need” also applies when a defendant seeks disclosure 
pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(ii).  United States v. Broyles, 37 F.3d 1314, 1318 (8th 
Cir. 1994); accord Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 
(1959) (applying original version of Rule 6(e) and concluding that “the burden . . . 
is on the defense to show that ‘a particularized need’ exists for the [grand jury] 
minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy”). 
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threat: the USA PATRIOT Act of 200190 (“Patriot Act”) and the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002.91  Following the release of the 9/11 
Commission Report92 in July 2004, Congress responded, yet again, by 
enacting the far-reaching Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.93  Each significantly amended the provisions 
of Rule 6(e). 
1. The Patriot Act Amendments 
Following September 11th, bipartisan recognition of the need 
for increased cooperation between law enforcement and the 
intelligence community grew.94  Shortly thereafter, tools to 
implement such cooperation were integrated into the war on 
terrorism.  The Patriot Act was intended to “deter and punish 
terrorist acts in the United States and around the world” and 
“enhance law enforcement investigatory tools.”95  Its key function was 
to break down the historic barriers between federal law enforcement 
and the intelligence community.96 
a. The Amendment of Rule 6(e) 
Concerned that in the course of criminal investigations grand 
 
 90 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and in scattered sections 
of 18, 22, 28 and 50 U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter Patriot Act].  . 
 91 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (to be 
codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 5, 6, and 18 U.S.C.). 
 92 NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT (2004). 
 93 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, 118 Stat. 3638 (to be codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and in scattered sections of 
U.S.C.). 
 94 See 147 CONG. REC. S10,560 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch) 
(“In this new war, terrorists are a hybrid between domestic criminals and 
international agents.  We must lower the barriers that discourage our law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies from working together to stop these 
terrorists.  These hybrid criminals call for new, hybrid tools.”); id. at S10,556 
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (“[F]ew would disagree that information learned in a 
criminal investigation that is necessary to combating terrorism or protecting the 
national security ought to be shared with the appropriate intelligence and national 
security officials.”). 
 95 115 Stat. at 272. 
 96 See Jim McGee, An Intelligence Giant in the Making; Anti-Terrorism Law Likely to 
Bring Domestic Apparatus of Unprecedented Scope, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2001, at A4; supra 
note 94. 
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juries would obtain information that could prevent terrorist acts,97 
Congress included a provision in the Patriot Act amending Rule 6(e) 
to permit98 disclosure of grand jury materials without judicial 
approval99 
when the matters involve foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)),100 or foreign intelligence 
information (as defined in clause (iv) of this subparagraph),101 to 
 
 97 For example, during floor debate, Senator Graham offered the following 
hypothetical: 
Let me give a couple of hypothetical but eerily-close-to-reality 
examples.  It is likely that there are, tonight, grand juries meeting at 
various places in the United States to deal with issues related to the 
events of September 11.  Witnesses may be providing information—
information about training camps in Afghanistan, ground warfare 
techniques used by al-Qaida and the Taliban, the types and quantity of 
weapons available.  This type of information will be critical for the 
military—critical for the military now, not 2 years from now when these 
cases might go to trial. 
147 CONG. REC. S10,566 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Graham). 
 98 Under the new provision, disclosure “may” be made, but is not required.  FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A) (2001) (amended 2002) (current version at FED. R. CRIM. P. 
6(e)(3)(D)).  But see infra text accompanying notes 119–35 (discussing Attorney 
General’s information-sharing guidelines). 
 99 The House of Representatives’ version of this bill would have required judicial 
intervention.  H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, pt. 1, § 353 (2001). 
 100 “The term ‘foreign intelligence’ means information relating to the capabilities, 
intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign 
organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.”  50 U.S.C. § 
401a(2) (2000 & Supp. I 2001).  “The term ‘counterintelligence’ means information 
gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence 
activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign 
governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or 
international terrorist activities.”  Id. § 401a(3). 
 101 Clause (iv) defines “foreign intelligence information” as: 
(I) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, 
that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against— 
 (aa) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power; 
 (bb) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power; or 
 (cc) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or 
network of a foreign power or by an agent of foreign power; or 
(II) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, 
with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to— 
 (aa) the national defense or the security of the United States; or 
 (bb) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. 
Patriot Act § 202(a)(iv), 115 Stat. at 279–80 (codified as amended at FED. R. CRIM. P. 
6(e)(3)(D)(iii)). 
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any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, 
immigration, national defense, or national security official in 
order to assist the official receiving that information in the 
performance of his official duties.102 
Although Congress’ expressed goal was to prevent terrorism, the 
definitions used encompass an extraordinarily broad range of 
information, including information unrelated to a threat against the 
United States or its citizens.  For example, “foreign intelligence” 
includes information relating to the act of a foreign person.103  
Conceivably, this could include a foreign citizen’s plans to take part 
in a peaceful protest here or abroad or even to buy a loaf of bread. 
This new exception (the “Patriot intelligence exception”) differs 
from other exceptions to Rule 6(e) secrecy in two critical respects.  
First, the Patriot intelligence exception permits prosecutors, acting 
solely on their own authority, to disclose grand jury materials to 
persons who are not involved in the prosecution of federal crimes.104  
Unlike those traditional exceptions granting prosecutors the right to 
disclose grand jury materials,105 this exception is not grounded in 
what is necessary to the proper functioning of the grand jury.  A 
grand jury’s function is to determine whether there is probable cause 
that a crime has occurred,106 not to determine whether a crime could 
occur in the future.  Under the traditional exceptions, a prosecutor 
might, for example, instruct an FBI agent to obtain physical evidence 
for submission to the grand jury.  To obtain the additional evidence 
needed by the grand jury to reach a just result, the prosecutor might 
find it necessary to disclose grand jury materials to the agent.  In 
short, the disclosure would be made with the intent to serve the 
grand jury. 
In contrast, the purpose of the Patriot intelligence exception is 
fundamentally different.  A prosecutor could, for example, report the 
existence of a financial link between a recent immigrant and a 
suspected terrorist to an immigration official who was not working for 
the prosecutor and would not be expected to report back to the 
grand jury.  Moreover, the immigration official could use that 
 
 102 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V) (2001) (amended 2002) (current version at 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)). 
 103 See supra note 100. 
 104 Irvin B. Nathan & Christopher D. Man, The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 Poses a 
New Threat to Grand Jury Secrecy, 9 BUS. CRIMES BULL. 1, 1 (Feb. 2002). 
 105 See supra notes 53–66 and accompanying text. 
 106 BRENNER & LOCKHART, supra note 13, § 3.1. 
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information as part of a deportation proceeding.  In other words, 
disclosures completely unrelated to the functioning of the grand jury 
are permissible. 
Second, the Patriot intelligence exception allows disclosure of 
grand jury information to persons who are not subject to the same 
secrecy obligations as other categories of persons to whom grand jury 
materials may be disclosed without judicial intervention.  Pursuant to 
Rule 6(e)(2)(B), grand jurors, attorneys for the government, and 
persons to whom disclosure is made under the law enforcement 
exception are not permitted to disclose matters occurring before the 
grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in the rules.107  To 
illustrate, an FBI agent who receives grand jury materials pursuant to 
the law enforcement exception108 may not share those materials with 
other persons. 
Under the Patriot intelligence exception, however, the 
obligation of secrecy imposed by Rule 6(e)(2) does not apply to 
persons obtaining information.  Instead, Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(i) provides 
that federal officials receiving information under the new exception 
“may use the information only as necessary in the conduct of that 
person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized 
disclosure of such information.”109  The Patriot Act provides no 
explicit sanction for officials who violate this limitation.110  Indeed, as 
a practical matter, because no record of those receiving information 
is filed with the court overseeing the grand jury, identification of 
violators is unlikely.111 
 
 107 FED. R. CRIM P. 6(e)(2)(B). 
 108 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii). 
 109 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(i); see 50 U.S.C. § 403-5d (Supp. I 2001) 
(authorizing sharing of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information 
“obtained as part of a criminal investigation” with federal intelligence officials, etc., 
and mandating that such information be used “only as necessary in the conduct of 
the person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure 
of such information”). 
 110 A court might attempt to rely upon its inherent powers to order a contempt 
sanction.  See supra note 41. 
 111 Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(ii) merely provides that “[w]ithin a reasonable time after 
disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(D), an attorney for the government must file, 
under seal, a notice with the court . . . stating that such information was disclosed 
and the departments, agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made.”  Its 
failure to require prosecutors to specifically identify the federal officials to whom 
disclosure is made contrasts sharply with the requirement that government 
personnel to whom disclosure is made pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) be identified.  
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(B). 
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Arguably, the Patriot intelligence exception significantly 
undermines the doctrine of grand jury secrecy.112  Unlike traditional 
exceptions authorizing disclosure for purposes unrelated to the 
grand jury function,113 the Patriot intelligence exception does not 
require judicial intervention or a demonstration of particularized 
need. 
b. The Adoption of Information-Sharing Guidelines 
During the debates over the Patriot Act, certain members of 
Congress voiced concern over the lack of judicial oversight.114  In the 
end, however, Congress’ desire to take swift action to prevent future 
terrorist attacks prevailed.  Conversely, Congress included a 
mechanism for limiting disclosure.  Section 905(a) of the Patriot Act 
requires the Attorney General to develop guidelines for information 
sharing between federal law enforcement agencies and the 
intelligence community.115  These guidelines were to be promulgated 
after consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA).116  Nevertheless, the new guidelines, issued on 
September 23, 2002, by Attorney General John Ashcroft, do little to 
safeguard grand jury secrecy.117  In fact, the guidelines make it more 
likely that grand jury materials will be disclosed.  While the Patriot 
intelligence exception118 permits disclosure to federal intelligence 
officials, “these guidelines require expeditious disclosure.”119 
 
 112 Nathan & Man, supra note 104, at 1. 
 113 See supra notes 30–38, 67–89 and accompanying text. 
 114 147 CONG. REC. S10,556 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Graham). 
 115 Patriot Act § 905(a), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. at 388–89 (codified at 50 
U.S.C. § 403-5b (Supp. I 2001)). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Heads of Department 
of Justice Components & Heads of Federal Departments & Agencies with Law 
Enforcement Responsibilities, Guidelines Regarding Disclosure to the Director of 
Central Intelligence and Homeland Security Officials of Foreign Intelligence 
Acquired in the Course of a Criminal Investigation (Sept. 23, 2002), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/section905a.pdf [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum I]. 
 118 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D). 
 119 Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 2, at 2 (emphasis added).  
Specifically, Guideline 2 states: 
Law Enforcement Information Subject to Mandatory Disclosure.  Subject to 
any exceptions established by the Attorney General in consultation 
with the Director of Central Intelligence (the “Director”) and the 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, section 905(a) and 
these guidelines require expeditious disclosure to the Director, the 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security or other members of 
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The guidelines allow for “exemptions from the mandatory 
disclosure obligation.”120  Requests for exemption “must be submitted 
by the department, component or agency head in writing [i.e., the 
United States Attorney] with a complete description of the facts and 
circumstances giving rise to the need for an exception and why lesser 
measures such as use restrictions are not adequate.”121  The Attorney 
General, on a case-by-case basis,122 makes the final determination as to 
whether an exemption is warranted.123 
The standard created by the guidelines is the exact opposite of 
that applied in every other situation involving prosecutorial release of 
grand jury materials.  Instead of a presumption of secrecy, the 
guidelines create a presumption of disclosure.  Rather than requiring 
a particularized showing of the need for disclosure, the guidelines 
require a particularized showing of the need for secrecy. 
Furthermore, the guidelines allow for the “originator” of the 
 
the U.S. intelligence community or homeland security agencies as are 
designated under paragraph 4, infra, of foreign intelligence acquired 
in the course of a criminal investigation conducted by Federal Law 
Enforcement Agencies. 
a.  As used herein, the term “foreign intelligence” is defined in section 
3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 401a) as: 
“information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of 
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or 
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.” 
b.  The term “section 905(a) information” means foreign intelligence 
acquired in the course of a criminal investigation. 
c. Section 203(d) of the USA PATRIOT Act provides that: 
“Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be lawful for foreign 
intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 401a)) or foreign 
intelligence  information obtained as part of a criminal investigation to 
be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, 
immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to 
assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his 
official duties.”  Thus, no other Federal or state law operates to prevent 
the sharing of such information so long as disclosure of such 
information will assist the Director and the Assistant to the President 
for Homeland Security in the performance of their official duties, and 
Federal Law Enforcement Agencies shall, notwithstanding any other 
law, expeditiously disclose to the Recipients (as defined below) section 
905(a) information. 
 120 Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 9, at 6. 
 121 Id. Guideline 9(c), at 6. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. Guideline 9(b), at 6.  In making this determination, the Attorney General is 
to consult with the CIA Director and the Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security.  Id. 
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information to partially restrict its use.124  As a general rule, 
information disclosed under the guidelines will be disclosed “free of 
any originator controls or information use restrictions.”125  Use of 
grand jury materials may be restricted “to comply with notice and 
record keeping requirements and to protect sensitive law 
enforcement sources and ongoing criminal investigations and 
prosecutions.”126  Any restrictions on use, however, “shall be no more 
restrictive than necessary to accomplish the desired effect.”127  Unless 
the information contained within the grand jury materials relates to 
potential terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, the prosecuting 
official assigned to the case must be consulted prior to disclosure.128 
Again, this rule runs counter to the standard applied to every 
other prosecutorial release of grand jury materials.  In the absence of 
use restrictions, as long as recipients of the materials believe that 
disclosure is necessary to conduct their duties, they may share the 
information with anyone they choose.129  Under the pre-September 
11th exceptions, “second generation” recipients did not exist.  Those 
who received grand jury materials from a prosecutor were prohibited 
from re-disclosing them to further-removed recipients.130  Conversely, 
now neither Rule 6(e) nor the guidelines purport to limit second 
generation recipients’ use of grand jury materials.  Once this level of 
disclosure is reached, any pretense of secrecy is a thing of the past. 
Notably, the Attorney General’s guidelines differentiate 
between, on the one hand, the treatment of materials relating to “a 
 
 124 Id. Guideline 8, at 6. 
 125 Id. Guideline 8(a), at 6. 
 126 Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 8(c), at 6. 
 127 Id. Guideline 8(b)(i), at 6. 
 128 Id. Guideline 5(c), at 4–5.  The disclosure must be made “no later than 48 
hours after the prosecutor is initially notified.”  Id at 4. 
 129 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(i).  Executive Order No. 12,333 may afford 
“United States persons” some protections. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 
59,941, 59,950 (Dec. 4, 1981).  The order limits intelligence agencies’ ability “to 
collect, retain or disseminate information concerning United States persons.”  Id.  
Before disclosing grand jury materials identifying United States persons to federal 
intelligence officials, the prosecutor must label the materials as containing 
identifying information.  Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to 
Heads of Department Components, Guidelines for Disclosure of Grand Jury and 
Electronic, Wire, and Oral Interception Information Identifying United States 
Persons 1 (Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/section203.pdf.  
Under certain circumstances, the receiving agency may delete identifying references 
to United States persons.  Id. at 2. 
 130 See generally supra notes 54–66 and accompanying text. 
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potential terrorism131 or a Weapons of Mass Destruction132 threat to 
the United States homeland, its critical infrastructure, key resources 
(whether physical or electronic) or to United States persons or 
interests worldwide” and, on the other hand, the treatment of other 
grand jury materials subject to disclosure under the Patriot 
intelligence exception.133  The former must be disclosed to the proper 
authorities “immediately,” while the latter must be disclosed “as 
expeditiously as possible.”134  Under the “as expeditiously as possible” 
standard, the prosecutor has forty-eight hours to identify use 
restrictions or request an exception to the disclosure requirement 
from the Attorney General.135 
c. The Use of the Patriot Intelligence Exception 
Any question as to whether the Patriot intelligence exception 
would be used was quickly answered.  Between September 11, 2001, 
and July 26, 2002, there were approximately forty disclosures of 
federal grand jury materials containing foreign intelligence 
information.136  These disclosures involved thirty-nine separate grand 
juries.137 
 
 131 “Terrorism Information” is defined as: 
All information relating to the existence, organization, capabilities, 
plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, 
or activities of foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals 
or threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, 
United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other 
nations, or to communications between such groups or individuals, or 
information relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed to be 
assisting or associated with them. 
Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 5(a)(i), at 4. 
 132 “Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Information” is defined as: “All 
information relating to conventional explosive weapons and non-conventional 
weapons capable of causing mass casualties and damage, including chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear agents and weapons and the means of delivery of 
such weapons.”  Id. Guideline 5(a)(ii), at 4. 
 133 Id. Guideline 5(a), at 3. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. Guideline 5(a), (c), at 3, 4–5. 
 136 Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable F. 
James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, enclosing 
Questions Submitted by the House Judiciary Committee to the Attorney General on 
USA PATRIOT Act Implementation 1 (July 26, 2002) [hereinafter Bryant Letter (July 
26, 2002)] (on file with author). 
 137 Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable F. 
James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, enclosing 
Follow-up Questions Submitted by the House Judiciary Committee to the Attorney 
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Interestingly, twenty-seven of the disclosures made during this 
period involved the use of pre-Patriot Act procedure.138  On 
September 20, 2002, the Justice Department informed the House 
Judiciary Committee that “grand jury information was shared under 
Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii),” the law enforcement exception, which permits 
disclosure without court approval to government personnel of materials 
needed to help prosecutors enforce federal criminal law.139  However, 
on October 4, 2002, the Justice Department reported that the 
districts involved “filed a motion and obtained an order from the 
court permitting such disclosure.”140 
Given that the law enforcement exception permits disclosure 
without a court order, this discrepancy is puzzling.  Ostensibly, 
prosecutors either sought court approval of a Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) 
disclosure as a check on their decision-making authority or sought 
disclosure pursuant to former Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i),141 which permitted 
court-ordered disclosure.  Regardless of which provision was used, 
sharing information with the intelligence community is 
problematic.142 
If the prosecutor’s purpose is to obtain additional information 
for a federal criminal case under investigation, use of the law 
enforcement exception143 is legitimate.144  If, for example, a 
 
General on USA Patriot Act Implementation 1 (Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Bryant 
Letter (Sept. 20, 2002)] (on file with author).  Presumably, the bulk of these 
disclosures were made prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act. 
 138 Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable F. 
James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary 1 (Oct. 4, 
2002) [hereinafter Bryant Letter (Oct. 4, 2002)] (on file with author). 
 139 Bryant Letter (Sept. 20, 2002), supra note 137, at 1. 
 140 Bryant Letter (Oct. 4, 2002), supra note 138, at 1. 
 141 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i) (2000) (amended 2001) (currently at FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)). 
 142 Indeed, at least one senator based her support for amending Rule 6(e) on the 
belief that “[u]nder current law, law enforcement officials involved in a grand jury 
investigation cannot share information gathered in the grand jury with the 
intelligence community, even if that information would prevent a future terrorist 
act.”  147 CONG. REC. S10,592 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
 143 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii). 
 144 The Justice Department explained, 
[i]n the context of the 9/11 investigation, grand jury information was 
shared with members of numerous JTTFs [Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces] around the country who participated in the PENTBOMB 
[September 11th] investigation as well as the representatives of the 
various agencies stationed at SIOC [Strategic Information and 
Operations Center].  The reason for this is that it is often necessary to 
disclose grand jury information to those involved in an investigation in 
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prosecutor needed the help of the CIA in obtaining information 
about a foreign target to present to the grand jury, a CIA agent might 
fall within the category of government personnel to whom disclosure 
is permitted.  But if the prosecutor’s intent is not to enforce federal 
criminal law, but rather to inform the CIA of a threat to national 
security, the law enforcement exception does not apply.  Additionally, 
a CIA agent who receives grand jury materials under this exception 
may not disclose them to others.145  If the Justice Department’s intent 
in making the disclosures was to address a threat to national security, 
an absolute ban on further disclosure seems unworkable. 
In contrast, former Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i),146 which permitted court-
ordered disclosure “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial 
proceeding,” would not impose an obligation of secrecy upon the 
recipient.147  Again, however, this exception does not appear to apply 
to situations in which the disclosure is intended to protect national 
security interests.  In United States v. Baggot,148 the Supreme Court 
strictly construed this language, holding that “the Rule contemplates 
only uses related fairly directly to some identifiable litigation, 
pending or anticipated. . . .  If the primary purpose of disclosure is 
not to assist in preparation or conduct of a judicial proceeding, 
disclosure under (C)(i) is not permitted.”149  Thus, the fact that 
“litigation is factually likely to emerge” from an investigation of a 
national security threat would not support disclosure under former 
Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i).150 
The remaining disclosures that were made during the period 
from September 11, 2001, to July 2002, were made pursuant to the 
Patriot intelligence exception.  According to the Justice Department, 
all of the reporting districts151 invoking the new exception had filed 
 
order to take necessary follow-up steps to advance the investigation. 
Bryant Letter (Sept. 20, 2002), supra note 137, at 1. 
 145 See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text. 
 146 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i) (2000) (amended 2001) (currently at FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i)). 
 147 Rule 6(e)(2)’s obligation of secrecy applies only to grand jurors, interpreters, 
persons recording or transcribing testimony, prosecutors, and persons to whom 
disclosure is made under the law enforcement exception.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). 
 148 463 U.S. 476 (1983). 
 149 Id. at 480. 
 150 Id. 
 151 At the time the Justice Department made its report, thirty-six of the thirty-eight 
districts involved in the disclosure of intelligence materials had reported.  Bryant 
Letter (Oct. 4, 2002), supra note 138, at 1. 
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the required notice of disclosure with the court supervising the grand 
jury through which the information was obtained.152  Thus far, the 
supervising courts have not complained about the timeliness of the 
notices filed.153 
The Justice Department provided the House Judiciary 
Committee with a redacted exemplar154 that provides some helpful 
insights into how the exception is being used.155  The most striking 
 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id.  According to the Justice Department, “[t]he courts supervising the grand 
juries are responsible for supervising the filing of notices and for disciplining any 
failure to file such notices.”  Bryant Letter (Sept. 20, 2002), supra note 137, at 1.  How 
the supervising court would ever learn of a failure to file is an open question. 
 154 Bryant Letter (Oct. 4, 2002), supra note 138, at 1. 
 155 The notices are provided in the form of pleadings filed under seal.  The 
sample notice reads: 
Pursuant to Section 203(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 279 (2001), codified as Fed. R. Crim. P. 
6(e)(3)(C), the undersigned attorney for the government hereby 
provides notice to the Court regarding the disclosure to certain Federal 
departments, agencies, and entities of criminal investigative 
information that may include “matters occurring before” the above-
captioned grand jury regarding xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and 
related criminal activity, as follows: 
 1.  Grand juries empaneled in this district have issued subpoenas and 
engaged in other investigative activities in conjunction with 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx and related criminal activity.  To the extent that 
information relating to the grand juries’s [sic] activities constitutes 
“matters occurring before the grand jury” within the meaning of Rule 
6(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it may not be 
disclosed “except as otherwise provided for” under the Rules.  See Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2). 
 2.  Section 203(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act, which was signed into 
law on October 26, 2001, amends Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) to authorize 
disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury: 
 (V) when the matters involve foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign intelligence information (as 
defined in clause (iv) of this subparagraph), to any Federal law 
enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, 
or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that 
information in the performance of his official duties. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V). 
 3.  The investigation into the September 11 attacks and related 
criminal activity involves such “foreign intelligence” or 
“counterintelligence” and “foreign intelligence information.”  
Moreover, the sharing of information developed during the 
investigation assists a variety of “Federal law enforcement, intelligence, 
protective, immigration, national defense, [and] national security 
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feature of the exemplar is the sheer breadth of the disclosure.  The 
court is informed that the intelligence interests in question “involve 
literally thousands of Federal law enforcement and other officials.”156  
The recipients include everyone from the CIA to the Social Security 
Administration Inspector General.157  Such widespread dissemination 
of grand jury materials is unprecedented.  Under the new exception, 
 
official[s]” in the performance of their official duties.  Consequently, 
criminal investigative information, which may include matters 
occurring before grand juries, has been disclosed and will continue to 
be disclosed to such officials.  Of course, an official who receives such 
information “may use that information only as necessary in the conduct 
of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the 
unauthorized disclosure of such information.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 
6(e)(3)(C)(iii). 
 4.  The amended rule requires that, “[w]ithin a reasonable time after 
such disclosure, an attorney for the government shall file under seal a 
notice with the court stating the fact that such information was 
disclosed and the departments, agencies, or entities to which disclosure 
was made.”  Id.  Unlike the notice required in other contexts, see Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(B), in matters involving these sort of intelligence 
interests, which may (as in this case) involve literally thousands of 
Federal law enforcement and other officials, the rule does not require 
the notice to name each individual official to whom the grand jury 
information has been disclosed, only their “departments, agencies, or 
entities.” 
 5.  Accordingly, the undersigned attorney for the government hereby 
notifies the Court that information relating to the above-captioned 
grand jury investigations, which may include “matters occurring before 
the grand jury,” has been and will be disclosed to the following Federal 
departments, agencies, and entities pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 
6(e)(C)(i)(V): 
 (a) Department of Justice (including Federal Bureau of 
Investigation). 
 (b) Department of Treasury. 
 (c) Department of Defense. 
 (d) Department of State. 
 (e) Department of Transportation. 
 (f) Department of Energy. 
 (g) Postal Inspection Service. 
 (h) Central Intelligence Agency. 
 (i) National Security Agency. 
 (j) National Security Council. 
 (k) Naval Criminal Investigative Service [sic] 
 (l) Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
 (m) Federal Aviation Administration. 
 (n) Social Security Administration Inspector General. 
Bryant Letter (Sept. 20, 2002), supra note 137, app. (alterations in original) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id. 
  
2005 PRESERVING GRAND JURY SECRECY 521 
 
 
prosecutors are not even constrained by the need to list the 
individual recipients of the information.158  Unmistakably, passage of 
the Patriot Act ushered in a new era in the use of federal grand jury 
materials. 
2. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Amendments 
The new era continued with the passage of yet more far-reaching 
legislation in the form of the Homeland Security Act of 2002159 and 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.160 
a. The Homeland Security Act and the Purported 
Amendment of Rule 6(e) 
While much of the public’s attention to the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 was directed towards provisions creating a new cabinet-
level Department of Homeland Security, the Act also included 
provisions that purported to amend Rule 6(e) yet again.161  The 
concern that the improvements in information sharing wrought by 
the enactment of the Patriot Act did not go far enough prompted the 
amendment.162  Specifically, legislators expressed their concern that 
the Patriot Act failed to bring state and local officials into the 
information loop.163  These officials were believed to be in the 
vanguard of the war on terrorism.164  It was Congress’ sense “that 
 
 158 The Justice Department described the Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) requirement that 
prosecutors list each individual to whom information is disclosed as “onerous and a 
diversion of resources from investigative activity.”  Bryant Letter (Sept. 20, 2002), 
supra note 137, at 1. 
 159 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (to be 
codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 5, 6, and 18 U.S.C.). 
 160 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, 118 Stat. 3638 (to be codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and in scattered sections of 
U.S.C.). 
 161 See Homeland Security Act § 895, 116 Stat. at 2256–57.  The Homeland 
Security Act incorporated provisions from an earlier bill, the Homeland Security 
Information Sharing Act, H.R. 4598, 107th Cong. (2002), Homeland Security Act § 
891, 116 Stat. at 2252–53 (codified at 6 U.S.C.A. § 481 (West Supp. 2004)).  See 148 
Cong. Rec. H3936–48 (daily ed. June 26, 2002). 
 162 See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H3939 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). 
 163 See, e.g., id. 
 164 Congress specifically found that “[s]ome homeland security information is 
needed by the State and local personnel to prevent and prepare for terrorist attack” 
and that “State and local personnel have capabilities and opportunities to gather 
information on suspicious activities and terrorist threats not possessed by Federal 
agencies.”  Homeland Security Act § 891(b)(4), (8), 116 Stat. at 2252 (codified at 6 
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Federal, State, and local entities should share homeland security 
information to the maximum extent possible.”165  Legislators also 
voiced concerns that the Patriot Act failed to address the problem of 
domestic terrorism.166 
To address these concerns, Congress passed an amendment to 
Rule 6(e) that would allow disclosure without judicial approval 
when matters involve a threat of actual or potential attack or 
other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, domestic or 
international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering 
activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power 
or by an agent of a foreign power, within the United States or 
elsewhere, to any appropriate federal, state, local, or foreign 
government official for the purpose of preventing or responding 
to such a threat.167 
 
U.S.C.A. § 481 (West Supp. 2004)). 
 165 Id. § 891(c), 116 Stat. at 2253. 
 166 148 CONG. REC. H3939; see also H.R. REP. NO. 107-534, pt. 1, § 6 (2002) 
(“Domestic threat information is included because it is not always clear whether 
threats to public safety result from international or domestic terrorism threats.  The 
anthrax attacks are one example of where the origin of that attacks [sic] is not 
clear.”). 
 167 Homeland Security Act § 895, 116 Stat. at 2256 (codified as amended at FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)).  The Act also sought to amend the language of existing Rule 
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) to include personnel of a foreign government among those to whom 
an attorney for the government may disclose grand jury materials when needed to 
assist in enforcing federal criminal law.  Id. § 895(1).  Under this provision, a 
prosecutor disclosing grand jury materials to a foreign official would be required to 
provide the official’s name to the court that impaneled the grand jury.  FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 6(e)(3)(B).  Foreign officials receiving grand jury materials pursuant to this 
exception would have an obligation of secrecy under existing Rule 6(e)(2).  
Additionally, the Act sought to amend then Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I) to expressly allow 
a court to order disclosure “upon request by an attorney by the government when 
sought by a foreign court or prosecutor for use in an official criminal investigation.”  
Homeland Security Act § 895(2)(B)(i), 116 Stat. at 2256.  In so doing, the Act 
clarified that at least some foreign proceedings qualify as “judicial proceedings” 
under Rule 6.  Similarly, the Act sought to amend then Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(IV) to 
expressly permit a court to order disclosure of a violation of foreign criminal law to a 
foreign official for the purpose of enforcing that law.  Id. § 895(2)(B)(ii).  This 
amendment was considered necessary because, 
even when the Government [made] an appropriate showing to the 
court (i.e., a showing similar to that required for disclosure of grand 
jury material in a domestic proceeding), the rule as . . .  written [did] 
not expressly authorize courts to order disclosure.  As a consequence, 
the U.S. prosecutor sometimes [was forced to] re-subpoena the same 
information from the original sources. 
H.R. REP. NO. 107-534, pt. 1, § 6. 
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The Homeland Security Act amendments were supposed to become 
effective sixty days after their date of enactment.168  In drafting the 
amendments, however, Congress failed to consider the amendment 
and restructuring of Rule 6(e) that came into effect on December 1, 
2002.169  This restructuring made the amendments incapable of being 
 
 168 Homeland Security Act § 4, 116 Stat. at 2142. 
 169 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 historical notes to 2002 amendments.  As of December 1, 
2002, Rule 6(e)(2), (3) read: 
(2) Secrecy. 
 (A) No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except 
in accordance with Rule 
  6(e)(2)(B). 
 (B) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following persons must 
not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury: 
 (i) a grand juror; 
 (ii) an interpreter; 
 (iii) a court reporter; 
 (iv) an operator of a recording device; 
 (v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony; 
 (vi) an attorney for the government; or 
 (vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule 
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii); 
(3) Exceptions. 
 (A) Disclosure of a grand jury matter—other than the grand jury’s 
deliberations or any grand juror’s vote—may be made to: 
 (i) an attorney for the government for use in performing that 
attorney’s duty; 
 (ii) any government personnel—including those of a state or state 
subdivision or of an Indian tribe—that an attorney for the government 
considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney’s duty to 
enforce federal criminal law; or 
 (iii) a person authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3322. 
 (B) A person to whom information is disclosed under Rule 
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) may use that information only to assist an attorney for 
the government in performing that attorney’s duty to enforce federal 
criminal law.  An attorney for the government must promptly provide 
the court that impaneled the grand jury with the names of all persons 
to whom a disclosure has been made, and must certify that the attorney 
has advised those persons of their obligation of secrecy under this rule. 
 (C) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand jury 
matter to another federal grand jury. 
 (D) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand jury 
matter involving foreign intelligence, counterintelligence (as defined 
in 50 U.S.C. § 401a), or foreign intelligence information (as defined in 
Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(iii)) to any federal law enforcement, intelligence, 
protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official 
to assist the official receiving the information in the performance of 
that official’s duties. 
 (i) Any federal official who receives information under Rule 
6(e)(3)(D) may use the information only as necessary in the conduct 
  
524 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:495 
 
 
 
of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the 
unauthorized disclosure of such information. 
 (ii) Within a reasonable time after disclosure is made under Rule 
6(e)(3)(D), an attorney for the government must file, under seal, a 
notice with the court in the district where the grand jury convened 
stating that such information was disclosed and the departments, 
agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made. 
 (iii) As used in Rule 6(e)(3)(D), the term “foreign intelligence 
information” means: 
 (a) information, whether or not it concerns a United States 
person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect 
against— 
 • actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a 
foreign power or its agent; 
 • sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or its 
agent; or 
 • clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or 
network of a foreign power or by its agent; or 
 (b) information, whether or not it concerns a United States 
person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates 
to— 
 • the national defense or the security of the United States; or 
 • the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. 
 (E) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a manner, and 
subject to any other conditions that it directs—of a grand jury matter: 
 (i) preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding; 
 (ii) at the request of a defendant who shows that a ground may 
exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred 
before the grand jury; 
 (iii) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter 
may disclose a violation of state or Indian tribal criminal law, as long as 
the disclosure is to an appropriate state, state-subdivision, or Indian 
tribal official for the purpose of enforcing that law; or 
 (iv) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter 
may disclose a violation of military criminal law under the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate 
military official for the purpose of enforcing that law. 
 (F) A petition to disclose a grand jury matter under Rule 
6(e)(3)(E)(i) must be filed in the district where the grand jury 
convened.  Unless the hearing is ex parte—as it may be when the 
government is the petitioner—the petitioner must serve the petition 
on, and the court must afford a reasonable opportunity to appear and 
be heard to: 
 (i) an attorney for the government; 
 (ii) the parties to the judicial proceeding; and 
 (iii) any other person whom the court may designate. 
 (G) If the petition to disclose arises out of a judicial proceeding in 
another district, the petitioned court must transfer the petition to the 
other court unless the petitioned court can reasonably determine 
whether disclosure is proper.  If the petitioned court decides to 
transfer, it must send to the transferee court the material sought to be 
disclosed, if feasible, and a written evaluation of the need for 
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executed.170  Although President George W. Bush immediately 
indicated that he planned to seek technical amendments from 
Congress to permit the provisions to go into effect,171 these 
amendments were never enacted.  The fact that Congress amended 
Rule 6(e) without taking into account its planned restructuring 
underscores the haste with which it reached its decision to alter 
centuries-old policies. 
b. The Amendment of Rule 6(e) 
The release of the 9/11 Commission Report172 in July 2004 spurred 
Congress to further address the issues of intelligence reform and 
terrorism prevention.173  These efforts culminated in the enactment 
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,174 
which, while perhaps best known for establishing a Director of 
National Intelligence, also included provisions affecting grand jury 
 
continued grand jury secrecy.  The transferee court must afford those 
persons identified in Rule 6(e)(3)(F) a reasonable opportunity to 
appear and be heard. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)–(3) (2002) (amended 2004). 
Along with restyling Rule 6(e), the 2002 amendments contained some 
noteworthy substantive changes.  Under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(iii), a prosecutor may 
disclose grand jury materials to a government attorney for purposes of enforcing civil 
forfeiture and civil banking laws under 18 U.S.C. § 3322.  This provision was added to 
ensure that the amendments to Rule 6 did not supercede section 3322.  FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 6. advisory committee’s note (2002 amendments).  Underlying section 3322 is the 
idea that “[b]ecause all civil forfeiture actions are now recognized as law 
enforcement functions, grand jury information should be available to government 
attorneys for their use in all civil forfeiture cases.”  H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 1, § 8 
(1997).  Furthermore, Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) now expressly recognizes that to enforce 
federal criminal law a prosecutor may need to disclose information to government 
personnel of an Indian tribe.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. advisory committee’s note (2002 
amendments). 
 170 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 historical notes to 2002 amendments.  The renumbering of 
Rule 6(e)’s sections made it impossible to make the requested insertions.  See 
Statement of President George W. Bush on the Signing of H.R. 5005, the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (Nov. 25, 2002), 2002 WL 31650677, at *5 [hereinafter 
President’s Statement]. 
 171 President’s Statement, supra note 170, at *5. 
 172 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT (2004). 
 173 See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S11,859 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Frist). 
 174 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, 118 Stat. 3638 (to be codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and in scattered sections of 
U.S.C.). 
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secrecy.175  These provisions were intended to restore the 
amendments created by the Homeland Security Act.176  In certain 
respects, the changes that the Patriot Act wrought to Rule 6(e) pale 
in comparison to those Congress created via the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act.  The amendments to Rule 6 within 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act further erode 
the doctrine of grand jury secrecy.  Most significantly, one 
amendment creates a new exception which allows disclosure without 
judicial approval of 
any grand jury matter involving, within the United States or 
elsewhere, a threat of attack or other grave hostile acts of a 
foreign power or its agent, a threat of domestic or international 
sabotage or terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering 
activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power 
or by its agent, to any appropriate Federal, State, State 
subdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign government official, for the 
purpose of preventing or responding to such threat or activities.177 
By permitting prosecutors to disclose grand jury materials to 
persons who are not intimately involved in the prosecution of federal 
crimes, Congress has again created an exception that fundamentally 
diverges from the traditional exceptions.178  In contrast to the 
traditional exceptions controlling disclosure to persons unrelated to 
the grand jury function,179 the new exception (the “terrorism 
prevention exception”) requires no judicial intervention and no 
 
 175 Id. § 6501(a), 118 Stat. at 3760 (codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)). 
 176 150 CONG. REC. S11,995 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 177 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 6501(a) (codified at FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(d).  The Act also amends the language of existing Rule 
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) to include personnel of a foreign government among those to whom 
an attorney for the government may disclose grand jury materials when needed to 
assist in enforcing federal criminal law.  Id. § 6501(a)(1)(A).  Under this provision, a 
prosecutor disclosing grand jury materials to a foreign official would be required to 
provide the official’s name to the court that impaneled the grand jury.  FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 6(e)(3)(B).  Foreign officials receiving grand jury materials pursuant to this 
exception would have an obligation of secrecy under existing Rule 6(e)(2).  
Additionally, the Act adds Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(iii) to expressly allow a court to order 
disclosure “at the request of the government, when sought by a foreign court or 
prosecutor for use in an official criminal investigation.”  Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act § 6501(a)(1)(C)(ii).  In so doing, the Act clarified that at 
least some foreign proceedings qualify as “judicial proceedings” under Rule 6.  
Similarly, the Act amended existing Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(iv) to expressly permit a court 
to order disclosure of a violation of foreign criminal law to a foreign official for the 
purpose of enforcing that law.  Id. § 6501(a)(1)(C)(iii). 
 178 See supra notes 54–66 and accompanying text. 
 179 See supra notes 67–89 and accompanying text. 
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showing of particularized need.180 
Several aspects of this new exception are disquieting.  First, the 
Act poorly defines the types of information subject to disclosure.  In 
drafting the Patriot Act amendments, Congress specifically defined 
“foreign intelligence” and other categories of information that may 
be disclosed.181  Although arguably broad, these definitions place 
some limits on disclosure.  The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act, on the other hand, provides no such limits.  For 
example, “domestic . . . terrorism” 182 is susceptible to multiple 
interpretations.  If a prosecutor learns via grand jury testimony of a 
planned antiwar sit-in, may the prosecutor inform intelligence 
officials of the identity of the demonstration’s planners?183  The 
question of where “ordinary” crime ends and “domestic terrorism” 
begins is left unanswered.184 
Second, because information may be given to any “appropriate” 
official,185 the Act does not limit the categories of government officials 
to whom information may be disclosed.  While Congressional 
testimony186 and debate187 on both the Homeland Security Act and the 
 
 180 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D). 
 181 See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 182 See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 6501(a), 118 Stat. 
at 3760. 
 183 Allowing individual prosecutors to determine when disclosure is warranted will 
likely lead to inconsistent interpretations. 
 184 Federal criminal law defines “domestic terrorism” as activities that: 
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be 
intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2000 & Supp. I 2001). 
 185 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 6501(a)(1)(B)(i). 
 186 See, e.g., A Review of the Tools to Fight Terrorism Act: Hearing Before the Sen. Judiciary 
Comm. Subcomm. On Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, 108th Cong. (2004) 
(statement of Jonathan Turley, Professor, George Washington University Law 
School) (“This provision allows for the sharing of national security and grand-jury 
information with state and local governments.  It was previously enacted by Congress 
and has only been reintroduced due to the Supreme Court’s revision of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.”); The Homeland Security Information Sharing Act: Hearing 
on H.R. 4598 Before the House Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, 107th Cong. (2002) 
(statement of Rep. Chambliss). 
 187 See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S11,995 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Kyl); 148 CONG. REC. H3941–42 (daily ed. June 26, 2002) (statement of Rep. 
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Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act amendments centered on 
the need to involve state and local officials in the war on terrorism, 
the new exception also permits disclosure to foreign officials.  
Nothing in the Congressional record explains this decision.188  
Indeed, there is no discussion of the unique risks disclosure to 
noncitizens and nonresidents might create for the grand jury process. 
Moreover, the language of the terrorism prevention exception 
contrasts sharply with that of the Patriot intelligence exception, 
which provides a list of approved categories of disclosees.189  Given 
that the terrorism prevention exception is intended to prevent acts 
such as terrorism and sabotage, and that the circumstances 
surrounding such acts would be highly variable, the desire to allow 
some leeway as to the selection of the appropriate official is 
understandable.190  Nonetheless, the complete lack of boundaries 
creates unprecedented access to grand jury materials. 
Perhaps because Congress had already approved the terrorism 
prevention exception as part of the Homeland Security Act,191 its 
inclusion in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
elicited almost no comment.192  Though legislators involved in the 
 
Weiner). 
 188 Still, the possible ramifications of this provision did not go unnoticed by all.  In 
analyzing the potential amendment, the Congressional Research Service noted, “It 
remains to be seen how the courts will respond to the use of the grand jury as an 
intelligence gathering device for foreign officials.”  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., H.R. 10 
(9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT) AND S. 2845 (NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004): A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 41 (2004), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32635.pdf (updated Oct. 21, 2004). 
 189 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 190 Rule 6(e) permits disclosure to “any appropriate Federal, State, State 
subdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign government official.”  FED. R. CRIM P. 
6(e)(3)(D).  The term “appropriate” is neither defined nor limited in any way.  See 
id. 
 191 Homeland Security Act § 895, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. at 2156.  See supra 
notes 172–180 and accompanying text. 
 192 During the consideration of the conference report on the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Senator John Kyl provided the sole 
commentatry on the changes to Rule 6(e).  His analysis was as follows: 
Subtitle F, section 6501, Sharing Grand-Jury Information With State 
and Local Governments, this section amends current law to authorize 
the sharing of grand-jury information with appropriate state and local 
authorities. 
I do not think that one can overstate the importance of information 
sharing, of tearing down the walls that prevent different parts of the 
Government from exchanging intelligence and working together in 
the war on terror.  A graphic illustration of the importance of 
streamlined information sharing is provided by another pre-September 
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11 investigation.  Like the Moussaoui case, this investigation also came 
tantalizing close to substantially disrupting or even stopping the 9/11 
plot, and also ultimately was blocked by a flaw in our antiterror laws.  
The investigation to which I refer involved Khalid Al Midhar [sic], one 
of the suicide hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77, which was 
crashed into the Pentagon, killing 58 passengers and crew and 125 
people on the ground. 
An account of the investigation of Midhar [sic] is provided in the 9/11 
Commission’s staff Statement No. 10.  That statement notes as follows: 
During the summer of 2001 <an FBI official> . . . found <a> cable 
reporting that Khalid Al Mihdhar had a visa to the United States.  A 
week later she found the cable reporting that Mihdhar’s visa 
application—what was later discovered to be his first application—
listed New York as his destination. . . .  The FBI official grasped the 
significance of this information. 
The FBI official and an FBI analyst working the case promptly met with 
an INS representative at FBI Headquarters.  On August 22 INS told 
them that Mihdhar had entered the United States on January 15, 2000, 
and again on July 4, 2001. . . .  The FBI agents decided that if Mihdhar 
was in the United States, he should be found. 
These alert agents immediately grasped the danger that Khalid Al 
Midhar [sic] posed to the United States, and immediately initiated an 
effort to track him down.  Unfortunately, at the time, the law was not 
on their side.  The Joint Inquiry Report of the House and Senate 
Intelligence Committees describes what happened next: 
Even in late August 2001, when the CIA told the FBI, State, INS, and 
Customs that Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and two other “Bin 
Laden-related individuals” were in the United States, FBI Headquarters 
refused to accede to the New York field office recommendation that a 
criminal investigation be opened, which might allow greater resources 
to be dedicated to the search for the future hijackers. . . .  FBI attorneys 
took the position that criminal investigators “CAN NOT” (emphasis 
original) be involved and that criminal information discovered in the 
intelligence case would be “passed over the wall” according to proper 
procedures.  An agent in the FBI’s New York field office responded by 
e-mail, saying: “Whatever has happened to this, someday someone will 
die and, wall or not, the public will not understand why we were not 
more effective in throwing every resource we had at certain problems.” 
The 9/11 Commission staff report assesses the ultimate impact of these 
legal barriers: 
Many witnesses have suggested that even if Mihdhar had been found, 
there was nothing the agents could have done except follow him onto 
the planes.  We believe this is incorrect.  Both Hazmi and Mihdhar 
could have been held for immigration violations or as material 
witnesses in the Cole bombing case.  Investigation or interrogation of 
these individuals, and their travel and financial activities, also may have 
yielded evidence of connections to other participants in the 9/11 plot.  
In any case, the opportunity did not arise. 
Congress must do what it can now to make sure that something like 
this does not happen again—that arbitrary, seemingly minor 
bureaucratic barriers are not allowed to undermine our best leads 
toward uncovering an attack on the United States.  Section 6501 is a 
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passage of the Homeland Security Act expressed some concern over 
the disclosure of grand jury information,193 they believed that the 
proposed amendments contained adequate safeguards to protect 
grand jury secrecy.194  As with persons receiving grand jury materials 
under the Patriot intelligence exception, the obligation of secrecy 
imposed by Rule 6(e)(2) does not apply to persons obtaining 
information under the terrorism prevention exception.  Still, there 
are some limitations on use.  Officials receiving grand jury materials 
pursuant to this exception may use it only as needed in the conduct 
of their duties.195  Specifically, officials must use the materials for the 
purpose specified by the exception: “preventing or responding to . . . 
[a] threat.”196  Joint guidelines from the Attorney General and the 
Director of National Intelligence may impose additional limitations 
on use by state, local, and foreign officials.197  Those officials may be 
punished for contempt of court for any violation of that obligation.198 
The effectiveness of these safeguards remains to be seen.  As 
with the Patriot intelligence exception,199 there is no requirement that 
prosecutors identify individual recipients of grand jury materials to 
the court overseeing the grand jury.  Prosecutors need only file a 
notice with the court indicating that the information was disclosed 
and identifying the entity receiving the materials.200  Furthermore, 
 
substantial step in that direction. 
The change made be section 6501 previously was enacted by the 
Homeland Security Act, but that change never went into effect because 
the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure amended by the HSA was 
revised by the Supreme Court shortly after the enactment of the HSA, 
and the amendment made by HSA presupposed the earlier text of the 
Federal rule.  The same provisions were introduced as part of S. 2599 
by Senators CHAMBLISS and me on June 24, 2004. 
150 CONG. REC. S11,995 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004) (ellipses and alterations in angle 
brackets in original). 
 193 148 CONG. REC. H3942 (daily ed. June 26, 2002) (statement of Rep. Weiner) 
(“I share the concerns that some raised in committee that we do not want this 
information to chip away at the confidentiality of the grand jury.”). 
 194 Id. at H3939 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (noting that “[t]he 
information may only be disclosed for the specified purpose of preventing and 
responding to a threat.  Additionally, recipients may only use the disclosed 
information in the conduct of their official duties as is necessary, and they are subject 
to the restrictions for unauthorized disclosures, including contempt of court”). 
 195 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(i). 
 196 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D). 
 197 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(i). 
 198 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(7). 
 199 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 200 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(ii). 
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with the exception of the contempt sanction created for violations of 
the joint guidelines discussed above,201 Congress again failed to 
expressly grant the judiciary the power to impose contempt 
sanctions.202  How a court might be expected to impose sanctions for 
contempt without knowing the identity of the person or persons to 
whom disclosure was made is a mystery. 
c. The Future of Rule 6(e) 
In a period of little over three years, Congress has fundamentally 
altered a doctrine of grand jury secrecy that has been revered and 
protected for centuries.203  It did so in a time of national crisis and 
without the notice and comment traditionally accompanying changes 
to the rules of procedure.204  Now is an opportune time for Congress 
to reflect on the changes it has wrought.  As it considers whether 
other measures enacted under the Patriot Act should be 
reauthorized, it would be prudent for Congress to revisit the post-
September 11th amendments and reevaluate both their 
constitutionality and their impact upon the functioning of the grand 
jury. 
II. GRAND JURY SECRECY AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person shall be held to 
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”205  The parameters of 
this right, however, have yet to be fully defined.  In particular, the 
United States Supreme Court has never directly ruled on whether the 
right to secrecy of grand jury proceedings is implicit in a person’s 
right to indictment by a grand jury.  The examination of whether 
Congress should rethink the recent amendments to Rule 6(e) begins 
 
 201 See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text. 
 202 Again, the courts may possess the inherent power to impose this sanction.  See 
Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. 
Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 20 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Schiavo, 375 F. Supp. 475, 478 
(E.D. Pa. 1974); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 309 n.40 (N.D. Cal. 1952); 
4 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 41, at 20. 
 203 See discussion supra Part I.A & B. 
 204 See Michael Fitzpatrick, Code Orange: Will It Be Used To “End-Run” Federal 
Rulemaking Requirements?, 29 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 11 (2004).  See generally FEDERAL 
RULEMAKING, at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/procedurejc.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 
2005). 
 205 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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with an analysis of whether grand jury secrecy has constitutional 
underpinnings.  Given the magnitude of their consequences, the 
recent amendments to Rule 6(e) should compel Congress (if not the 
courts) to reevaluate this thorny issue. 
A. Costello v. United States: The Final Word on Grand Jury 
Rights? 
In Costello v. United States,206 the Supreme Court presented its 
clearest statement of the rights guaranteed by the Grand Jury Clause.  
The defendant in that case, Frank Costello, was indicted for and 
ultimately convicted of willfully attempting to avoid federal income 
taxes.207  Both during and after trial, the defendant moved to dismiss 
the indictment on the ground that it was based solely upon hearsay 
evidence, thus violating the Grand Jury Clause.208  The United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York denied his 
motion and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affirmed.209  In upholding the lower courts’ rulings, the 
Supreme Court concluded, “[a]n indictment returned by a legally 
constituted and unbiased grand jury . . . if valid on its face, is enough 
to call for trial of the charge on the merits.  The Fifth Amendment 
requires nothing more.”210 
Standing alone, Costello could be read to stand for the 
proposition that the right to indictment by a grand jury does not 
encompass the right to secrecy of grand jury proceedings.211  That is, 
if a grand jury is legally constituted, unbiased, and issues an 
indictment, the constitutional requirements are satisfied.212  Indeed, a 
few lower courts have specifically held that because the right to 
secrecy “was never intended as a safeguard for the interests of the 
accused,”213 it cannot be viewed as incorporated into the Fifth 
Amendment rights of the accused. 
 
 206 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
 207 Id. at 359–61. 
 208 Id. at 361. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. at 363. 
 211 See id. at 359. 
 212 Costello, 350 U.S. at 363. 
 213 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. at 285; see also United States v. Amazon 
Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931) (concluding that “none of the 
reasons for [grand jury secrecy] are founded upon an inherent right in the 
individual who is being investigated to the same constitutional safeguards that are 
unquestionably his when he is brought to trial for a given crime”). 
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B. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States: Acknowledging the 
Role of Grand Jury Secrecy 
Treating Costello as the final word on the rights encompassed by 
the Grand Jury Clause stretches the Court’s holding too far.  Though 
Costello addressed the limited question of what the Grand Jury Clause 
requires before a person may be subjected to trial,214 the Court’s 
holding did not address whether the Grand Jury Clause contains 
other requirements that must be satisfied to avoid dismissal of an 
indictment.  In Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,215 the Supreme 
Court spoke to this critical distinction.216  The defendants, Midland 
Asphalt Corporation and Albert C. Litterer, moved to dismiss the 
indictment against them on the grounds that the Government had 
violated Rule 6(e) by disclosing matters occurring before the grand 
jury.217  The United States District Court for the Western District of 
New York denied the motion.218  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
dismissed the defendants’ appeal on the grounds that Rule 6(e)‘s 
function is to “protect society’s interest in keeping secret the identity 
of grand jury witnesses and persons under investigation.”219  In 
affirming the Second Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court stated, 
“[t]here is a ‘crucial distinction between a right not to be tried and a 
right whose remedy requires the dismissal of charges.’”220 
Consistent with Costello, the Court noted that “a right not to be 
tried” exists “when there is no grand jury indictment.”221  The Court 
went on to hold that “[o]nly a defect so fundamental that it causes 
the grand jury no longer to be a grand jury, or the indictment no 
longer to be an indictment, gives rise to the constitutional right not 
to be tried.”222  The “isolated breach of the traditional secrecy 
requirements” by the Government was deemed insufficient to satisfy 
either of these requirements.223  Nonetheless, the Court’s ruling in 
Midland Asphalt left open the possibility that violations of the secrecy 
 
 214 Costello, 350 U.S. at 363. 
 215 489 U.S. 794 (1989). 
 216 Id. at 800–02. 
 217 Id. at 796. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. at 797 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 220 Id. at 801 (quoting United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 
269 (1982)). 
 221 Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 802. 
 222 Id. at 802. 
 223 Id. 
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requirements incorporated into Rule 6(e) might provide the basis for 
a reversal of a conviction on appeal.224 
Perhaps most importantly, the Court clarified the protections 
afforded by the Grand Jury Clause, acknowledging that 
“[u]ndoubtedly the common-law protections traditionally associated 
with the grand jury attach to the grand jury required by this provision 
[the Grand Jury Clause]—including the requisite secrecy of grand 
jury proceedings.”225  Essentially, the Court indicated that defendants 
have a Fifth Amendment right to be indicted by a grand jury that 
functions under the traditional, common-law rules of secrecy.226  
Given that the Supreme Court has “consistently . . . recognized that 
the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the 
secrecy of grand jury proceedings,”227 such a rule would make sense. 
C. Exploring the Interests Protected by Grand Jury Secrecy 
Grasping the constitutional underpinnings of the right to 
secrecy is impossible without first understanding the grand jury’s 
function.  The grand jury’s “establishment in the Constitution ‘as the 
sole method for preferring charges in serious criminal cases’ indeed 
‘shows the high place it [holds] as an instrument of justice.’”228  In 
recent years, the Supreme Court has stressed that the grand jury 
serves “the ‘dual function of determining if there is probable cause to 
believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting citizens 
 
 224 Id. at 800.  Additionally, the Court left open the possibility that in an extreme 
circumstance, a violation of grand jury secrecy could give rise to the right not to be 
tried.  Id. at 802.  Although the Court found that an “isolated breach of the 
traditional secrecy requirements” did not give rise to such a right, id., the Court 
failed to address whether a pattern of such breaches might do so.  See id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. at 802. 
 227 Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979); 
accord Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 630 (1990). 
 228 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399–400 (1959) 
(quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 359, 362 (1956)).  In the words of 
Justice Harlan: 
In the secrecy of the investigations by grand juries, the weak and 
helpless—proscribed, perhaps, because of their race, or pursued by an 
unreasoning public clamor—have found, and will continue to find, 
security against official oppression, the cruelty of mobs, the 
machinations of falsehood, and the malevolence of private persons 
who would use the machinery of the law to bring ruin upon their 
personal enemies. 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 554–55 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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against unfounded criminal prosecutions.’”229  “The . . .  concern for 
the grand jury’s dual function underlies the ‘long-established policy 
that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the 
federal courts.’”230 
The Supreme Court has recognized four distinct interests 
protected by the right to secrecy in grand jury proceedings.231  First, 
“if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective 
witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing 
that those against whom they testify would be aware of that 
testimony.”232  Second, “witnesses who appeared before the grand jury 
would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open 
to retribution as well as to inducements.”233  Third, the risk would 
exist “that those about to be indicted would flee, or would try to 
influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment.”234  
Fourth, “by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that 
persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be 
held up to public ridicule.”235 
Clearly, not all of these interests implicate a defendant’s 
constitutional rights.236  But the first two interests go to the very heart 
of the grand jury function of shielding the innocent from 
prosecution.  The system cannot work without witnesses who “feel 
free to speak the truth without reserve.”237  The “cloak of silence” 
covering grand jury proceedings was born in part of “the desire to 
create a sanctuary, inviolate to any intrusion except on proof of some 
special and overriding need, where a witness may testify, free and 
 
 229 United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423 (1983) (quoting Branzburg 
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686–87 (1972)) (emphasis added); see supra notes 13–19 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the grand jury’s historical purpose, which 
recognized a dual function. 
 230 Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 424 (quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 
U.S. 677, 681 (1958)); accord Costello, 350 U.S. at 362 (“The grand jury is an English 
institution, brought to this country by the early colonists and incorporated in the 
Constitution by the Founders.  There is every reason to believe that our 
constitutional grand jury was intended to operate substantially like its English 
progenitor.”).  Traditionally, the English grand jury “act[ed] in secret.” Id. 
 231 Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 424; Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 218. 
 232 Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 219. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 The third, for example, relates to the public’s interest in determining whether 
probable cause exists to believe a crime has been committed. 
 237 Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1939). 
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unfettered by fear of retaliation.”238 
It is not unreasonable to question why special protection of 
grand jury witnesses is warranted.  Today’s grand jury witness may be 
tomorrow’s trial witness and, therefore, possibly subject to public 
questioning.  Of course, not every grand jury proceeding results in an 
indictment and not every indictment results in a trial.239  Likewise, 
every trial does not require testimony from every grand jury witness.  
In fact, it is far from certain that any given grand jury witness will ever 
be asked to testify at trial. 
More importantly, the difference in circumstances between an 
appearance at trial and one before the grand jury may also justify 
greater protection.240  Grand jury witnesses, who may be subjected to 
intense questioning or even browbeating by prosecutors, appear 
unprotected by counsel.241  Prosecutors are allowed to “go fishing” 
and  seek evidence, such as hearsay, that would be inadmissible at 
trial.242 
“Grand jury secrecy . . . ‘is as important for the protection of the 
innocent as for the pursuit of the guilty.’”243  If potential but unknown 
witnesses are concerned that their grand jury testimony will be not be 
protected, they may remain in the shadows.  If known witnesses fear 
for their safety or that of friends or family, they may offer incomplete 
or inaccurate testimony.244  Any time less than the whole story is told, 
 
 238 Texas v. U.S. Steel Corp., 546 F.2d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted). 
 239 For example, in fiscal year 1999 only six percent of all federal criminal 
prosecutions were disposed of by trial.  EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 14 (2000). 
 240 Daniel C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 339, 354 (1999) (“These circumstances might well combine to 
make a grand jury witness more vulnerable to injury, and more deserving of 
protection . . . .”). 
 241 Illinois v. F.E. Moran, Inc., 740 F.2d 533, 540 (7th Cir. 1984).  A grand jury 
witness does not have the right to have counsel present during questioning.  In re 
Petition of Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957).  In essence, the scope of the 
questioning is left to the prosecutor’s discretion.  See id. at 333–34. 
 242 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361–64 (1956). 
 243 United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983) (quoting United 
States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943)).  But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 
F. Supp. 283, 284–85 (E.D. Pa. 1933) (“The rule of secrecy . . . was designed for the 
protection of the witnesses who appear and for the purpose of allowing a wider and 
freer scope to the grand jury itself, and was never intended as a safeguard for the 
interests of the accused or of any third person.”). 
 244 Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979) 
(recognizing that publicizing preindictment proceedings would both deter witnesses 
from coming forward and inhibit witnesses who did appear from testifying “fully and 
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an innocent person may stand accused.245  The Grand Jury Clause 
mandates a real grand jury with all of its protections, not a grand jury 
in name only. 
Like termites undermining the structure of a building, repeated 
breaches of grand jury secrecy systemically injure the entire grand 
jury process.  Ultimately, the cumulative effect of disclosures denies 
grand jury targets their Fifth Amendment right to a meaningful 
review by the grand jury.  Arguably, this is why courts and rulemakers 
have been reluctant to recognize exceptions to the grand jury secrecy 
rule and to grant disclosure pursuant to those exceptions.246  If the 
exceptions are permitted to swallow the rule, the entire grand jury 
process suffers. 
To illustrate, if the testimony of a grand jury witness in Case A is 
disclosed, no injury may result to the target in Case A.  Although the 
disclosure may have no impact whatsoever on the proceedings 
involving this particular target, it does not follow that the disclosure is 
not harmful.  Over time, after more and more disclosures, the public 
becomes aware of the consequences, which has a chilling effect.247  
For example, fearing retribution of some sort, a witness in Case X fails 
to step forward with information about the identity of the true 
 
frankly”); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959) 
(noting that “testimony would be parsimonious if each witness knew that his 
testimony would soon be in the hands of the accused”). 
 245 In the words of Justice Harlan: 
In the secrecy of the investigations by grand juries, the weak and 
helpless—proscribed, perhaps, because of their race, or pursued by an 
unreasoning public clamor—have found, and will continue to find, 
security against official oppression, the cruelty of mobs, the 
machinations of falsehood, and the malevolence of private persons 
who would use the machinery of the law to bring ruin upon their 
personal enemies.  “Grand juries perform,” says [Justice] Story, ‘most 
important public functions, and are a great security to the citizens 
against vindictive prosecutions, either by the government or by political 
partisans, or by private enemies.’ 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 554–55 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
 246 See generally supra Part I. 
 247 Though I am not suggesting that the right of grand jury secrecy is based on the 
First Amendment, the threat of governmental action may function as a deterrent to 
speech.  To illustrate, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the threat of the 
loss of a financial benefit, such as a job or a contract, “in retaliation for speech may 
chill speech on matters of public concern.”  Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 
U.S. 668, 674 (1996).  The danger that grand jury witnesses’ testimony could be 
disclosed to third parties who would harm them may deter witnesses from speaking 
truthfully. 
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perpetrator of the crime and another witness tells the grand jury less 
than the whole story or, even worse, lies.  As a result, the target in 
Case X becomes the victim of a grand jury system weakened by 
secrecy breaches. 
D. Understanding the Dearth of Supreme Court Authority 
The dearth of Supreme Court authority directly addressing the 
existence of a constitutional right of grand jury secrecy can be 
explained by the types of cases the Court has heard.  Some cases 
simply have not implicated secrecy interests relating to the 
constitutional rights of defendants.  Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United 
States248 and Dennis v. United States249 involved motions in which the 
accused sought to obtain grand jury materials.  Given that any 
constitutional right to secrecy arises only from the Grand Jury Clause 
and this clause creates rights belonging to the accused (not the 
Government), these rights would not ordinarily come into play in a 
case in which the accused sought disclosure.250  In other cases, the 
Court was able to reach a finding that disclosure was not permitted 
under Rule 6(e).251  Accordingly, there was no need to examine any 
constitutional requirements. 
In the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has ordered disclosure 
pursuant to Rule 6(e) in only one case.  In United States v. John Doe, 
Inc. I,252 prior to filing a civil action, attorneys in the Justice 
Department’s Antitrust Division253 needed to consult with the United 
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and six 
attorneys within the Civil Division.254  The Justice Department officials 
 
 248 360 U.S. 395 (1959). 
 249 384 U.S. 855 (1966). 
 250 Of course, even in the absence of any constitutional protection, the Court may, 
in interpreting Rule 6(e), consider the “long-established policy of secrecy.”  Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass Co., 360 U.S. at 399 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 251 See United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 480 (1983) (holding that disclosure 
of grand jury materials to IRS to allow it to determine tax liability was not permitted 
under Rule 6(e)); Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 568 (1983) (finding 
that disclosure of grand jury materials to state attorney general without court 
approval and showing of particularized need would not comport with Rule 6(e) 
requirements); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) 
(concluding that defendants in civil antitrust action were not entitled to discovery of 
grand jury transcript in Government’s possession). 
 252 481 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 253 The case involved a potential claim under the False Claims Act.  Typically, the 
Civil Division handled such claims.  Id. at 105. 
 254 Id. at 104–05. 
  
2005 PRESERVING GRAND JURY SECRECY 539 
 
 
requested permission to disclose grand jury materials.255  The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York found 
that, because the Justice Department showed “a particularized need 
for disclosure,” the requirements of then-Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) were 
satisfied.256  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, finding the 
disclosure “unnecessary,” reversed.257  After reviewing the record, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the district court correctly applied 
the “particularized need” standard and did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing disclosure.258 
The John Doe case provided the Court with perhaps its best 
opportunity to examine the relationship between the right of grand 
jury secrecy and the right to a grand jury as created by the Grand Jury 
Clause.  Still, even this case did not require the Court to do so.  The 
case involved the application of former Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i),259 which 
required a court order to obtain discovery260 as well as “‘a strong 
showing of particularized need’ before disclosure is permitted.”261  
Even if the Court were to have expressly recognized the 
constitutional underpinnings of the right to secrecy, the test it 
applied would have likely been the same.262  Indeed, in applying the 
test, the Court specifically examined whether the disclosure would 
seriously threaten the recognized secrecy interests.263 
Partly because the need has never arisen, the Supreme Court has 
not yet directly addressed the constitutional underpinnings of the 
doctrine of grand jury secrecy.  The common-law and the pre-
September 11th version of Rule 6(e) provided safeguards equivalent 
to those required under the Fifth Amendment.264  If presented with 
the question, the Supreme Court should rule that a material breach 
of the traditional protection afforded grand jury secrecy is 
unconstitutional.  To rule otherwise would strip the right to 
indictment by a grand jury of much of its meaning. 
 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. at 111. 
 258 John Doe, 481 U.S. at 116–17. 
 259 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i) (2000) (amended 2001) (currently at FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i)); see supra note 81. 
 260 John Doe, 481 U.S. at 111. 
 261 Id. at 112 (quoting United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443–45 
(1983)). 
 262 See infra Part II.E. 
 263 John Doe, 481 U.S. at 113–15. 
 264 See infra text accompanying notes 269–80, 298–303. 
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E. Examining the Parameters of Grand Jury Secrecy 
Although the Supreme Court should recognize a Fifth 
Amendment right of grand jury secrecy, that right should not be 
absolute.265  The common-law protections attaching to the grand jury 
as required by the Fifth Amendment have always allowed for 
disclosure under certain circumstances.266  To determine the test for 
the constitutionality of a disclosure, one must scrutinize these 
protections, both as articulated by the courts and as codified in Rule 
6(e).  A review of the existing authorities indicates that for the 
disclosure of grand jury materials to comport with the Fifth 
Amendment, two criteria must be satisfied.  First, a “compelling 
necessity” for the disclosure must be established.267  Second, barring 
extraordinary circumstances, disclosure must be judicially 
supervised.268 
1. The Requirement of Compelling Necessity 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Procter & Gamble 
Co.269 provides an excellent starting point for examining the common-
law protections: 
The grand jury as a public institution serving the community 
might suffer if those testifying today knew that the secrecy of their 
testimony would be lifted tomorrow.  This “indispensable secrecy 
of grand jury proceedings,” must not be broken except where 
there is a compelling necessity.  There are instances when that 
need will outweigh the countervailing policy. But they must be 
 
 265 For example, see In re Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials Grand Jury No. 81-
1, Miami, 833 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1987), where the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit stated: 
[t]he policy of grand jury secrecy, whether viewed as a deeply-
rooted tradition of the common law or as itself implicit in the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee of indictment for “infamous crime,” is 
nonetheless a generalized one. The balancing that must take place 
is between the specific need of the Committee for material 
necessary to its constitutionally empowered task of impeachment in 
this case versus the specific secrecy interests that remain in these 
grand jury materials. 
Id. at 1443. 
 266 See supra notes 29–66 and accompanying text. 
 267 See Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979); 
see also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). 
 268 See supra notes 37–38, 42, 72 & 89 and accompanying text. 
 269 356 U.S. 677 (1958). 
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shown with particularity.270 
Procter & Gamble holds that a person seeking disclosure of grand 
jury materials bears the burden of establishing a “compelling 
necessity” for the disclosure.271  Such a requirement is entirely 
consistent with the common law reflected in pre-September 11th 
Rule 6(e).272  The analysis of whether a compelling necessity exists 
requires the application of a two-pronged test.273  Historically, matters 
occurring before a federal grand jury have been subject to disclosure 
in only a handful of circumstances: to serve the grand jury;274 to 
protect defendants against prosecutorial misconduct;275 to further the 
ends of justice in a judicial proceeding;276 and to assist state and 
Indian tribal officials in the prosecution of state and Indian tribal 
crimes.277  In each of these circumstances, disclosure may be required 
to protect an important societal interest.  Not every category of need 
is sufficient to outweigh the policy of protecting grand jury 
materials.278  Thus, a person seeking disclosure must first establish 
that his or her need is of the right kind.279  But merely establishing 
that a request falls within one of the recognized categories does not 
 
 270 Id. at 682 (citation omitted). 
 271 Id. 
 272 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 273 See United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 480 (1983). 
 274 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A) (allowing disclosure to “an attorney for the 
government for use in performing that attorney’s duty” and to “any government 
personnel . . . that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in 
performing that attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 
6(e)(3)(C) (“An attorney for the government may disclose any grand jury matter to 
another federal grand jury.”); supra notes 53–65 and accompanying text. 
 275 For examples of courts denying disclosure requests from defendants before 
grand juries see supra note 31 and cases cited therein.  See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 
6(e)(3)(E)(ii) (allowing disclosure when authorized by court “at the request of a 
defendant who shows that a ground may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a 
matter that occurred before the grand jury”). 
 276 See supra notes 32–33, 82–87 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 
6(e)(3)(E)(i) (allowing disclosure when authorized by court “preliminarily to or in 
connection with a judicial proceeding”). 
 277 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(iv) (allowing disclosure “at the request of the 
government if it shows that the matter may disclose a violation of State, Indian tribal, 
or foreign criminal law, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate state, state-
subdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign government official for the purpose of 
enforcing that law”). 
 278 Baggot, 436 U.S. at 480 (holding that “not every beneficial purpose, or even 
every valid governmental purpose, is an appropriate reason for breaching grand jury 
secrecy”). 
 279 Id. 
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suffice to establish that disclosure is appropriate.  A person seeking 
disclosure must prove that he or she possesses a particularized need 
for disclosure in the case at bar.280 
Principally, the courts have said that the need for the grand jury 
materials must be real.  “The particularized need test is a criterion of 
degree . . . .”281  For example, both private parties and governmental 
officials282 seeking grand jury materials for use in another judicial 
proceeding “must show the material they seek is needed to avoid a 
possible injustice in [the] . . . judicial proceeding, that the need for 
disclosure is greater than the need for secrecy, and that the request is 
structured to cover only material so needed.”283  Satisfying this burden 
is not easy.  To overcome the need for secrecy, the party seeking 
disclosure must establish that nondisclosure would result in great 
prejudice.284  Simply demonstrating that the grand jury materials 
sought are “relevant” is insufficient.285  In determining whether 
disclosure is necessary, a court may weigh the likelihood that the 
information could be obtained through other means.286 
Nonetheless, because it involves balancing interests, the 
“particularized need” standard has always offered some elasticity.287  
By its very nature, the standard requires that the facts be considered 
on a case-by-case basis.  To illustrate, a “court might reasonably 
consider that disclosure to Justice Department attorneys poses less 
risk of further leakage . . . than would disclosure to private parties or 
the general public.”288  Additionally, “under the particularized need 
standard, the district court may weigh the public interest, if any, 
served by disclosure to a governmental body . . . .”289 
The sole exception to the requirement of a showing of 
particularized need arises when a prosecutor seeks to disclose 
information either to other government attorneys involved in federal 
criminal investigations,290 to government personnel assisting 
 
 280 See supra notes 35–36, 82–87 and accompanying text. 
 281 Baggot, 463 U.S. at 480. 
 282 See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. 
 283 Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979). 
 284 See id. at 221. 
 285 United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 444 (1983). 
 286 Id. at 445. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 567 n.15 (1983). 
 290 See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
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government attorneys in such investigations,291 or to federal grand 
jurors.292  In the sense that it involves “revealing such information to 
other persons,” sharing information with members of these groups 
falls within the definition of disclosure.293  Nevertheless, in this case, 
sharing does not involve a revelation to a person not intimately 
involved in the functioning of the grand jury.  Two of the three 
groups, government attorneys and grand jurors, have the right to be 
present in the grand jury room.294  The third group, government 
personnel assisting government attorneys, is in some ways akin to a 
group that has long had access to the grand jury room, court 
stenographers.295  Like the stenographer, the FBI agent charged with 
gathering evidence serves as the handmaid of the grand jury.  
Furthermore, since persons within these groups may use the 
information disclosed only for limited purposes, such as to further a 
grand jury investigation,296 absent a belief that a need exists for their 
assistance, there is no logical reason for a prosecutor to disclose the 
information.  In short, a particularized need must exist or there 
would be no disclosure.  The circumstances surrounding this 
exception are truly unique. 
A finding of compelling necessity is clearly required for 
disclosure to comport with the requirements of the Grand Jury 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.297  The question then becomes who 
is responsible for making such a finding. 
2. The Need for Judicial Review 
The decision to disclose grand jury materials has historically 
been in the hands of the judiciary, rather than the prosecutor.298  To 
understand why, one must consider the exceptional status of the 
 
 291 See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text. 
 292 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 293 United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 108 (1987). 
 294 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)(1). 
 295 Id. 
 296 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(B) (“A person to whom information is disclosed 
under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) may use that information only to assist an attorney for the 
government in performing that attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law.”) 
 297 See supra notes 269–96 and accompanying text. 
 298 See supra notes 37, 42, 88–89 and accompanying text; see also Illinois v. Abbott & 
Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 567 (1983) (“There is only one exception to the general 
prohibition against disclosure without prior court approval, but that exception is 
limited to Federal Government personnel performing a specified federal law 
enforcement function.”). 
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grand jury.  “[T]he grand jury is mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but 
not in the body of the Constitution.  It has not been textually 
assigned, therefore, to any of the branches described in the first three 
Articles.  It “‘is a constitutional fixture in its own right.’”299 
Grand jury independence is fragile.  It depends on a delicate 
balance of judicial and prosecutorial oversight.  “A grand jury is 
clothed with great independence in many areas, but it remains an 
appendage of the court, powerless to perform its investigative 
function without the court’s aid, because powerless itself to compel 
the testimony of witnesses.”300  A grand jury cannot indict without the 
consent of the prosecutor.301  Thus, if the grand jury is an appendage 
of the court, it is also then an appendage of the prosecutor.  The 
Fifth Amendment’s “constitutional guarantee [of the right to 
indictment by a grand jury] presupposes an investigative body ‘acting 
independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge . . . .’”302  It is 
the fact that judge and prosecutor must share control that guarantees 
the grand jury’s independence.  This requirement of judicial 
involvement is entirely consistent with the common law reflected in 
pre-September 11th Rule 6(e).303 
The function of the grand jury is to serve as a shield against 
prosecutorial abuse,304 not as a prosecutor’s private tool.  As Lord 
Acton famously put it, “absolute power corrupts absolutely.”305  The 
involvement of the courts serves as a check on any abuse of power.  
For example, acting under the auspices of a court, a prosecutor may 
subpoena a witness or a record on the grand jury’s behalf.306  
Nonetheless, the court retains the right to “quash or modify a 
subpoena on motion if compliance would be ‘unreasonable or 
oppressive.’”307 
 
 299 United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 487 
F.2d 700, 712 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (intermediate citation omitted). 
 300 Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959), overruled in part by Harris v. 
United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965). 
 301 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Special Grand Jury 89-2, 813 F. Supp. 1451, 1461 
(D. Colo. 1992). 
 302 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (quoting Stirone v. United 
States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960)). 
 303 See supra Part I.B. 
 304 See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text. 
 305 THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 647 (E.D. Hirsch et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2002). 
 306 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17. 
 307 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 n.4 (1974) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. 
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In the context of disclosures, it only makes sense that the courts 
be given the power to decide when the veil of secrecy may be lifted.  
Grand juries derive their subpoena power from the courts.308  While 
broad, this power is not unlimited.309  By design, grand juries may 
exercise this power to obtain evidence relating to whether there is 
probable cause that a crime has been committed.310  They may not 
exercise this power for other purposes.311  “In short, if grand juries are 
to be granted extraordinary powers of investigation because of the 
difficulty and importance of their task, the use of those powers ought 
to be limited as far as reasonably possible to the accomplishment of 
the task.”312  When information obtained via a grand jury subpoena is 
sought for a purpose other than that for which it was intended (i.e., 
when disclosure is sought), the ultimate source of the subpoena 
power, the court, should be the final arbiter.  Otherwise, the grand 
jury becomes the prosecutor’s tool and the potential for misuse is 
substantial.313 
The court is also the body best suited to undertake the balancing 
of interests required to determine whether disclosure is warranted.  
“A court of law . . . is the sole means of protecting individual privacy 
from the airing of private judgment unguided by standards of due 
process.”314  If decision making were left in the hands of prosecutors, 
there would be no hearing, no presentation of evidence, no record, 
no guiding precedent, and no possibility of appeal.  Most 
importantly, there would be no neutral decision maker.  Weighing 
the various interests involved when disclosure of grand jury materials 
is at issue is a delicate task.315  Accordingly, the decision to remove the 
veil of grand jury secrecy should not be made on an ad hoc basis. 
Again, the sole exception to the requirement that disclosure be 
subject to judicial approval arises when a prosecutor seeks to disclose 
information to other government attorneys involved in federal 
criminal investigations, government personnel assisting government 
 
P. 17(c)). 
 308 Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959), overruled in part by Harris v. 
United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965). 
 309 United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991). 
 310 Id. at 297. 
 311 See, e.g., id. at 299. 
 312 United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 434–35 (1983). 
 313 Id. at 432–33. 
 314 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Special Grand Jury 89-2, 813 F. Supp. 1451, 1458 
(D. Colo. 1992). 
 315 Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1940). 
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attorneys in such investigations, or federal grand jurors.316  As 
discussed above, the circumstances giving rise to this exception are 
unique.317  A prosecutor is the best judge of the amount and type of 
investigative support needed to conduct a grand jury investigation.  
Additionally, “interlocutory appeal of issues disruptive of a grand jury 
investigation are not favored.”318  The sheer number of such requests 
would be likely to overwhelm the system.  Based on the foregoing, to 
comport with the Fifth Amendment right of grand jury secrecy, the 
disclosure of grand jury materials must be the result of a compelling 
necessity and must be judicially approved. 
III. RULE 6(E), THE CONSTITUTION, AND SOUND PUBLIC POLICY 
The exceptions to the doctrine of grand jury secrecy created by 
the Patriot Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act fundamentally differ from the traditional 
exceptions.319  Congress, reacting viscerally to catastrophic events, 
enacted these permanent additions to the legal landscape in haste 
and buried them deep within cumbersome bills.  The 340-plus-page 
Patriot Act was conceived, written, and enacted within six weeks of 
the attacks of September 11th.320  Few legislators voiced dissent, 
perhaps out of fear for being labeled unpatriotic.321  The typical 
committee hearings and debates surrounding legislation of this scope 
(or any scope for that matter) were absent.322  Rarely do passionate 
 
 316 See supra notes 53–64 and accompanying text. 
 317 See supra text accompanying notes 290–96. 
 318 S. REP. NO. 95-354, at 7 n.12 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 531; cf. 
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940) (“The duration of its (the 
grand jury’s) life, frequently short, is limited by statute.  It is no less important to 
safeguard against undue interruption the inquiry instituted by a grand jury than to 
protect from delay the progress of the trial after an indictment has been found.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 319 See supra notes 97–135, 172–80 and accompanying text. 
 320 The Patriot Act was introduced to the Senate on October 4, 2001, S. 1510, 
107th Cong. (2001), 147 CONG. REC. S10,285 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 2001), and signed into 
law by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001, as Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001). 
 321 The House passed the measure by a vote of 357 to 66, and the Senate passed it 
by a vote of 98 to 1.  Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1177–78 (2004). 
 322 See generally Emmanuel Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights 
in the United States: The Aftermath of September 11, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
1, 3 (2002) (“Congress took action without a proper debate on the Patriot Act’s 
ramifications and without providing the American public with an opportunity to 
voice its opinion, despite the enormous impact of the Patriot Act on the daily lives of 
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reactions produce good law.323  If Congress intends to permanently 
alter the grand jury system that is older than our nation itself, it 
should do so thoughtfully and with great care. 
During times of turmoil, the rights enshrined in our 
Constitution face their greatest threat.324  “In such periods the times 
seem so different, so out of joint, the threats from within or without 
seem so unprecedented, that the Constitution itself is perceived by 
many persons as anachronistic, or at least rigidly, unrealistically 
formalistic.”325  Congress must be ever aware of the dangers of 
allowing momentary fears to drive public policy. 
With this danger in mind, Congress should take the opportunity 
to review and repair any damage inflicted by the recent amendments, 
and should examine the Patriot intelligence exception and the 
terrorism prevention exception under the lens of the Constitution 
and with an eye to sound public policy. 
A. The Patriot Intelligence Exception 
A careful study of the Patriot intelligence exception reveals that 
its application results in disclosures causing systemic injury to the 
grand jury process.  As written and applied, the exception violates the 
 
all American citizens.”). 
 323 One need only ponder the internment and exclusion of Japanese-Americans 
during World War II to grasp the sometimes unthinkable misjudgments of leaders 
and citizens alike in wartime.  See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944).  Almost half a century later, Congress specifically recognized that: 
as described by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and 
Internment of Civilians, a grave injustice was done to both citizens and 
permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, 
relocation, and internment of civilians during World War II.  As the 
Commission documents, these actions were carried out without 
adequate security reasons and without any acts of espionage or 
sabotage documented by the Commission, and were motivated largely 
by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political 
leadership.  The excluded individuals of Japanese ancestry suffered 
enormous damages, both material and intangible, and there were 
incalculable losses in education and job training, all of which resulted 
in significant human suffering for which appropriate compensation has 
not been made.  For these fundamental violations of the basic civil 
liberties and constitutional rights of these individuals of Japanese 
ancestry, the Congress apologizes on behalf of the Nation. 
Restitution for World War II Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts, Pub. L. 
No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a(a) (2000)). 
 324 See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 449, 456–57 (1985). 
 325 Id. 
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Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment.326  Even if the 
constitutional problems are ignored, sound public policy reasons 
exist for reworking this exception.327 
1. The Fifth Amendment Analysis 
To satisfy the Fifth Amendment, any disclosure must be justified 
by a compelling necessity and must be judicially supervised.328  The 
Patriot intelligence exception sanctions disclosures that satisfy 
neither criterion.  The exception permits a prosecutor to disclose 
“any grand jury matter involving foreign intelligence, 
counterintelligence . . .  or foreign intelligence information . . . to 
any federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, 
national defense, or national security official to assist the official 
receiving the information in the performance of that official’s 
duties.”329 
Under the two-pronged compelling necessity test, the disclosure 
sought must be of a kind that serves an important societal interest.330  
Additionally, the need for disclosure must be shown with 
particularity.331  Undoubtedly, the Patriot intelligence exception 
satisfies the first prong of this test.  Disclosure for purposes of 
promoting national security has never been included among the 
recognized categories of disclosure.  Society’s interest in protecting 
itself against hostile acts, such as terrorism and sabotage, however, 
can hardly be less significant than its interest in the enforcement of 
public or private rights in a civil action, a long-recognized category of 
disclosure.332  Few would argue that if grand jury testimony uncovers a 
legitimate threat to national security, it should not be revealed to the 
proper authorities. 
The Patriot intelligence exception, however, fails to satisfy the 
second prong of the test.  Notably, the exception does not require 
persons seeking disclosure to show a particularized need.  Adopting 
the broadest possible terms, under this exception, disclosure is not 
limited to instances in which the United States is faced with some sort 
 
 326 See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 327 See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 328 See supra Part II.E. 
 329 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D); see also supra notes 97–135 and accompanying text 
(discussing amending Rule 6(e)). 
 330 See supra text accompanying notes 269–97. 
 331 See supra text accompanying notes 280–96. 
 332 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 283–85 (E.D. Pa. 1933). 
  
2005 PRESERVING GRAND JURY SECRECY 549 
 
 
of threat, immediate or otherwise.333  To illustrate, under the 
definition of “foreign intelligence” incorporated into the 
exception,334 a prosecutor would be permitted to report a foreign 
student’s membership in a particular mosque to the FBI or the CIA.335  
Alarmingly, the exception does not require any evidence of 
wrongdoing.336  Regardless of whether federal officials have a need for 
the information, if you happen to be a non-United States citizen, any 
of your activities may be reported. 
It is not simply the language of the Patriot intelligence exception 
that is troubling.  None of the pre-September 11th  exceptions in 
Rule 6(e) expressly require a showing of particularized need.337  But 
the more troubling aspect of this exception is the manner in which it 
has been interpreted.  The interpretation of this exception by the 
Department of Justice as reflected in the information-sharing 
guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General supports the idea 
that a showing of “particularized need” is not required.338  In fact, the 
guidelines make disclosure mandatory.339  If information falls within 
the categories described in Rule 6(e), it “shall be shared.”340  In the 
long history of the doctrine of grand jury secrecy, no exception has 
ever been used to mandate disclosure. 
The vast number of disclosures mandated by the guidelines is 
unprecedented.  To illustrate, as discussed above,341 the broad 
definition of “foreign intelligence” covers every act by a foreign 
citizen, here or abroad.  If the mandate provided by the guidelines is 
to be followed to the letter, a prosecutor would be charged with 
reporting a noncitizen’s trip to the grocery store for milk and bread.  
As directed by Congress,342 the Justice Department is creating a 
 
 333 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D). 
 334 Id. 
 335 The term “foreign intelligence” includes “information relating to the . . . 
activities of . . . foreign persons,” 50 U.S.C. § 401a(2) (2000 & Supp. I 2001); see supra 
note 100 and accompanying text.  A foreign student’s act of joining a mosque could 
be an “activity” of a “foreign person.” 
 336 See 50 U.S.C. § 401a(2). 
 337 See supra Part I.B. 
 338 See supra notes 116–24 and accompanying text. 
 339 Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 2, at 2; see also supra notes 
118–23, 131–35 and accompanying text. 
 340 Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 5, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 341 See supra notes 100 & 335 and accompanying text. 
 342 Congress is so concerned about foreign intelligence information being 
overlooked that it has mandated that the Department of Justice create a training 
program that helps law enforcement officials identify foreign intelligence materials 
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training program to help prosecutors and other law enforcement 
officials identify foreign intelligence information.343  There is no 
reason to believe, however, that the Department will ignore the 
language of Rule 6 and the guidelines and instruct prosecutors to 
more narrowly define this term. 
The guidelines permit a prosecutor to petition the Attorney 
General for an exemption.344  The focus, however, appears to be on 
protecting criminal investigations, not on balancing the various 
interests involved.345  No one seems to be watching out for the 
interests of grand jury targets.  A presumption of disclosure exists.346  
Accordingly, as interpreted by the Attorney General, the Patriot 
intelligence exception not only permits disclosure without a showing 
of compelling need, it endorses such disclosure. 
The Patriot intelligence exception also fails to satisfy the 
criterion that any disclosure be judicially supervised.347  The decision 
to disclose is completely in the hands of the Justice Department.  
Indeed, while the government must reveal the entity to which any 
information was disclosed to the court under whose authority the 
grand jury evidence was gathered, it need not identify the specific 
persons to whom the information was disclosed.348  The exception 
contains no mechanism for preventing its misuse. 
The Patriot intelligence exception creates a material breach of 
the protection afforded grand jury secrecy by the Fifth Amendment.  
The failure to require a showing of particularized need and the 
 
that must be shared.  Patriot Act § 908, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. at 391 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 509 note (Supp. I 2001)). 
 343 Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117 Guideline 3, at 2. 
 344 Id. Guideline 5(c), at 4. 
 345 Id. Guidelines 8(b) & 9, at 5–6.  The guidelines do not adequately address 
when an exemption is proper.  Guideline 9(b) indicates that until such time as the 
Attorney General creates permanent exemptions from the disclosure obligation, 
requests will be handled by the Attorney General on a “case-by-case” basis.  Id. 
Guideline 9(b), at 5.  No guidance as to the criteria to be considered is provided.  
Guideline 9(c), however, requires a written request for exemption that among other 
things explains “why lesser measures such as use restrictions are not adequate.”  Id. 
Guideline 9(c), at 6.  Thus, exemptions will be considered using the same criteria as 
requests for use restrictions.  Guideline 8(b) allows use restrictions when necessary 
“to protect sensitive law enforcement sources and ongoing criminal investigations 
and prosecutions.”  Id. Guideline 8(b), at 5. 
 346 See id. Guideline 9(c), at 6. 
 347 See discussion supra Part II.E.2. 
 348 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(ii).  Paragraph 5 of the notice examplar 
provided by the Department of Justice to Congress illustrates how vague the notice 
provided to the court can be.  See supra note 155. 
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failure to require judicial supervision create a situation in which 
enormous numbers of disclosures can, have,349 and will be made.  The 
cumulative effect of these disclosures will be to chill the participation 
of grand jury witnesses, and thereby cause systemic injury to the 
grand jury process.350 
2. The Public Policy Analysis 
Setting aside its constitutionality, public policy reasons strongly 
support amending the Patriot intelligence exception.  The collective 
wisdom of nearly a millennium has been that secrecy is 
“indispensable” to grand jury proceedings.351  “[W]hen disclosure is 
permitted, it is to be done ‘discretely and limitedly.’”352  The Patriot 
intelligence exception permits disclosure that is hardly discrete and 
far from limited.353  This exception permits so many disclosures that it 
threatens to swallow the rule of secrecy.  Upon closer examination, 
Congress will recognize that national security objectives could be met 
without drastically altering the grand jury system. 
There can be little doubt that under some circumstances, 
society’s interest in national security outweighs society’s need for 
grand jury secrecy.  But this is not always the case.  Every piece of 
information that falls within the broad definitions of foreign 
intelligence or counterintelligence information is not vital (or even 
relevant) to national security.  The Patriot intelligence exception 
lacks a reasonable mechanism for separating the wheat from the 
chafe. 
The most troubling aspect of this exception is the complete 
absence of judicial supervision.354  First, it is more likely that 
intelligence information obtained in the course of ordinary grand 
jury investigations will be disclosed.  Quite simply, no one is in a 
position to deny disclosure based on lack of relevancy or need.  In 
fact, the Attorney General’s guidelines in effect prohibit anyone from 
 
 349 See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text. 
 350 See generally supra notes 236–47 and accompanying text. 
 351 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (quoting 
United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943)); see also supra notes 9–28 and 
accompanying text, 39–46 and accompanying text, and Part II.C. 
 352 Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 869 (1966) (quoting Procter & Gamble, 
356 U.S. at 683). 
 353 See supra text accompanying notes 103–11, 334, 341–43. 
 354 See supra text accompanying notes 99, 104–13, 347–50. 
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denying disclosure based on such considerations.355 
Second, the lack of judicial supervision creates the temptation 
on the part of the Justice Department to abuse the grand jury 
system.356  Instead of using the grand jury’s powers to determine 
whether there is probable cause that a crime occurred, prosecutors 
could wield the grand jury as an intelligence-gathering tool. 
Pursuant to the information-sharing guidelines, the CIA 
Director has a direct role in the disclosure process.357  The guidelines 
thus foster an unhealthy entanglement between the Justice 
Department and the CIA.  The Director is charged with helping the 
Attorney General establish any formalized exceptions to the rule of 
disclosure,358 assisting in the design of a training curriculum which 
will allow law enforcement officials to identify intelligence 
information,359 and consulting with the Attorney General on decisions 
relating to whether to exempt specific materials from disclosure.360  
Further, Guideline 6 permits recipients of information to request 
“additional information,” “clarification,” or “amplification.”361  If a 
prosecutor knows that the CIA wishes to obtain additional facts on a 
matter unrelated to the grand jury’s criminal investigation, directing 
questions on that matter to a witness would be all too easy.362 
Information sharing between federal law enforcement agencies 
and intelligence agencies may well be necessary to national security, 
but such sharing could be fostered without the excessive 
entanglement created by the Patriot intelligence exception.  The 
decision as to whether or not to disclose grand jury materials could 
be made by a truly neutral decisionmaker, who could balance the 
interests of all involved; namely, a judge. The dangers these 
 
 355 See Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 2, at 2. 
 356 Jennifer M. Collins, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Sharing Grand Jury 
Information with the Intelligence Community Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1261, 1276 (2002). 
 357 With the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, this role will likely be assumed by the Director of National Intelligence.  See 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(i) (indicating the guidelines are to be promulgated by 
the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence).  As of the writing of 
this Article, however, the guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General and the 
Dircteor of the Central Intelligence Agency remain in force. 
 358 Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 2, at 2. 
 359 Id. Guideline 5(c), at 4. 
 360 Id. Guideline 9(b), at 5. 
 361 Id. Guideline 6(b), at 4. 
 362 Collins, supra note 356, at 1276.  This is especially true since the CIA itself lacks 
subpoena power. Id.; see also 50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1) (2000). 
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entanglements pose to our civil rights are well documented.363  Even 
though several justifications for lack of judicial supervision have been 
put forth,364 by simply requiring judicial supervision, this slippery 
slope could be avoided altogether. 
Members of the Bush Administration provided initial 
justifications.365  The House Judiciary Committee approved a version 
of the Patriot intelligence exception that required judicial 
supervision.366  It would have allowed disclosure: 
when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for the 
government, upon a showing that the matters pertain to 
international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of 
title 18, United States Code) or national security, to any Federal 
law enforcement, intelligence, national security, national defense, 
protective, immigration personnel, or to the President or Vice 
President of the United States, for the performance of official 
duties.367 
Some senators strongly advocated for judicial supervision.  
Senator Patrick Leahy, for example, argued that judicial oversight of 
disclosure of both wiretap information and grand jury materials to 
intelligence officials was warranted.368  On September 30, 2001, the 
Administration agreed to judicial oversight, but within two days it 
reneged.369  According to Senator Leahy, 
[t]he Administration offered three reasons for reneging on the 
original deal. First, they claimed that the involvement of the court 
would inhibit Federal investigators and attorneys from disclosing 
information needed by intelligence and national security officials.  
Second, they said the courts might not have adequate security and 
therefore should not be told that information was disclosed for 
intelligence or national security purposes. And third, they said the 
President’s constitutional powers under Article II give him 
authority to get whatever foreign intelligence he needs to exercise 
 
 363 Collins, supra note 356, at 1277 (describing massive abuse of federal law 
enforcement powers during Cold War). 
 364 See infra notes 365–70 and accompanying text. 
 365 See 147 CONG. REC. S10,555–56 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
 366 H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, pt. 1, § 353 (2001). 
 367 Id. (emphasis added). 
 368 147 CONG. REC. S10,555–56 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
 369 Id. 
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his national security responsibilities.370 
The first argument, that judicial supervision would somehow 
inhibit the disclosure of needed information, is specious.  If 
intelligence and national security officials truly “need” information, 
there is no reason to believe that a federal judge would refuse to 
authorize its disclosure.  To illustrate, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, which approves electronic surveillance and 
physical searches for intelligence purposes pursuant to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,371 has rarely refused a request.372  
 
 370 Id. at S10,556.  Sen. Leahy provided this explanation when discussing the 
Administration’s reasons for reneging on its agreement to permit judicial supervision 
of the disclosure of wiretap information.  Id. at S10,555–56.  Presumably, the 
Administration went back on its agreement to permit judicial supervision of the 
disclosure of grand jury information for the same reasons. 
 371 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1822 (2000). 
 372 In 1999, 
886 applications were made for orders and extensions of orders 
approving electronic surveillance or physical search under the Act.  
[T]he United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issued 
orders in 880 applications granting authority to the Government for 
the requested electronic surveillance and electronic searches. . . .  Five 
applications which were filed in late December 1999 were approved 
when presented to the Court on January 5, 2000.  No orders were 
entered which modified or denied the requested authority. 
Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to the Honorable J. Dennis Hastert, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives (Apr. 27, 2000). 
In 2000, 
1005 applications were made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court for electronic surveillance and physical search.  The Court 
approved 1003 of these applications in 2000.  Two of the 1005 
applications were filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
in December 2000 and approved in January 2001. . . .  No orders were 
entered which denied the requested authority. 
Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to L. Ralph Mecham, Director, 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 27, 2001). 
In 2001, 
932 applications were made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court for electronic surveillance and physical search.  The Court 
approved 934 applications in 2001.  Two of the 934 applications were 
filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in December 
2000 and approved in January 2001.  Two orders and two warrants were 
modified by the Court.  No orders were entered which denied the 
requested authority. 
Letter from Larry D. Thompson, Acting Attorney General, to L. Ralph Mecham, 
Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 29, 2002). 
“[A]ll 1228 applications presented to the Foreign Intelligen[c]e Surveillance 
Court in 2002 were approved.”  Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to L. 
Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 29, 
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The executive branch’s apparent distrust of the judiciary is alarming. 
The Bush Administration may also have been distrustful of the 
prosecutors themselves, fearing that prosecutors would be unwilling 
to expend the effort needed to obtain court approval.  After taking 
part in the Congressional Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community 
Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 
2001, a joint inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator 
Richard Shelby concluded that the Patriot intelligence exception was 
enacted because the Justice Department used Rule 6(e) as an excuse 
to avoid sharing information with the intelligence community.373  The 
Justice Department claimed Rule 6(e) protection for non-grand jury 
materials.374 
[W]orking from the assumption that it would be easier to change 
the law itself than to fix a parochial and dysfunctional 
institutional culture that used the Rule as an excuse to prevent all 
information-sharing, [Attorney General Ashcroft and Congress] 
determined simply to change Rule 6(e) to permit information-
sharing with intelligence officials.375 
Indeed, the law now requires law enforcement officials to share 
information.376  The fact that prosecutors may have misapplied Rule 
6(e) protections in the past does not justify a wholesale change in the 
rule or, more to the point, elimination of judicial oversight.  If the 
institutional culture within the Justice Department is dysfunctional, it 
must be changed from within. 
 
2003). 
 373 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SEN. RICHARD C. SHELBY, VICE-CHAIRMAN, SEN. SELECT 
COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE IMPERATIVE OF REFORM IN THE U.S. 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 58, S. REP. NO. 107-351 (2002). 
Rule 6(e) increasingly came to be used simply as an excuse for not 
sharing information—leaving vital collections of shareable information 
about international terrorist groups off-limits to IC intelligence 
analysts.  For years, it was routine FBI and DOJ practice to respond to 
virtually any Intelligence Community requests for information with the 
answer that “Rule 6(e)” prevented any response.  As two frustrated NSC 
veterans describe it, “Rule 6E [sic] is much more than a procedural 
matter: it is the bulwark of an institutional culture, and as Justice 
Department lawyers readily admit, it is used by the Bureau far more 
often than it should be.  It is one of the Bureau’s foremost tools for 
maintaining the independence that the FBI views as its birthright.” 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 374 Id. 
 375 Id. at 59. 
 376 Id. 
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The second argument (that the courts lack adequate security to 
be entrusted with sensitive information) is equally unsound.  First, 
the courts certainly have the benefit of as much security as many of 
the federal agencies and departments that will be the recipients of 
information disclosed under the Patriot intelligence exception.  A 
federal court poses no greater security risk than does the Social 
Security Administration.  Second, the problem of security could easily 
be overcome by creating a court akin to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court established under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).377  For example, the chief judge for 
each district could appoint a judge to hear all requests under the 
Patriot intelligence exception.  That judge could receive special 
training and employ heightened security measures.  Appeals could be 
made to a specialized court of review appointed by the Chief Justice. 
Finally, the third argument (that the President could employ 
powers under Article II to compel disclosure) begs the question of 
whether he should do so.  That the President has an absolute right to 
go through grand jury materials is doubtful at best—no president has 
ever exercised such a power.  Even assuming this power exists, 
exercising it in the indiscriminate manner permitted, and even 
mandated, under the Patriot intelligence exception would be 
foolhardy.  “In fact the whole theory of [the grand jury’s] function is 
that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving 
as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the 
people.”378  The President should and must trust that the courts will 
recognize his needs.379 
The Justice Department hinted at another justification in its 
response to questions from the House of Representatives’ Committee 
on the Judiciary.  In explaining how the Patriot intelligence 
exception aids in the information-sharing process, the Justice 
Department noted the “practical difficulties” involved in utilizing the 
traditional exceptions.380  For example, in discussing the problems 
involved with using the law enforcement exception, the Justice 
 
 377 See generally 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2000 & Supp. I 2001).  The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court consists of eleven district court judges selected by the Chief 
Justice.  Id. § 1803(a).  The court is conducted in secret in Washington, D.C., with 
the judges presiding on a rotating basis.  Jeremy D. Mayer, 9-11 and the Secret FISA 
Court: from Watchdog to Lapdog?, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 249, 250, 252 (2002). 
 378 United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992). 
 379 147 CONG. REC. S10,556 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 380 See Bryant Letter (Sept. 20, 2002), supra note 137, at 1. 
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Department pointed out that the exception requires a government 
attorney to provide the court with the name of each individual 
receiving information under the exception.381  “In the context of the 
9/11 investigations and other terrorism investigations that are 
national and international in scope and may involve literally 
thousands of investigators and dozens of grand juries, this 
requirement was onerous and a diversion of resources from 
investigative activity.”382  If the Justice Department views merely 
reporting information to a court as “onerous,” it likely views 
obtaining approval for disclosure as extraordinarily burdensome.  
Undeniably, permitting disclosure without court approval is more 
cost-effective.  The Supreme Court, however, has never viewed cost 
savings as a valid reason for lifting the veil of grand jury secrecy.383  If 
the Justice Department requires additional clerical or other help, the 
American taxpayers should be forced to bear that cost. 
Any “practical difficulties” resulting from the time required to 
obtain court approval could easily be addressed in the text of the 
rule.  The Attorney General’s information-sharing guidelines already 
distinguish between the treatment of materials relating to “a potential 
terrorism384 or Weapons of Mass Destruction385 threat” and the 
treatment of other grand jury materials subject to disclosure under 
the Patriot intelligence exception by permitting a forty-eight hour 
 
 381 Id. 
 382 Id. 
 383 United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 431 (1983) (concluding that 
while it would be “of substantial help to a Justice Department Civil attorney if he had 
free access to a storehouse of evidence compiled by a grand jury[,]” this type of cost 
savings could not justify a breach of grand jury secrecy). 
 384 “Terrorism Information” is defined as: 
All information relating to the existence, organization, capabilities, 
plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, 
or activities of foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals 
or threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, 
United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other 
nations, or to communications between such groups or individuals, or 
information relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed to be 
assisting or associated with them. 
Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 5(a)(i), at 3. 
 385 “Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Information” is defined as “All 
information relating to conventional explosive weapons and non-conventional 
weapons capable of causing mass casualties and damage, including chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear agents and weapons and the means of delivery of 
such weapons.”  Id. Guideline 5(a)(ii). 
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delay in the disclosure of the latter.386  When an immediate threat 
exists to national security, prosecutors could be permitted to disclose 
without judicial approval.  In contrast, when time is not of the 
essence, a fast-track judicial approval procedure is more appropriate. 
Accordingly, no valid justification exists for the absence of judicial 
supervision.  Congress could easily amend Rule 6(e) to protect 
important national security interests without destroying the secrecy 
that is so essential to grand jury proceedings. 
B. The Terrorism Prevention Exception 
The terrorism prevention exception raises the same 
constitutional issues as the Patriot intelligence exception.  As written, 
the terrorism prevention exception would violate the Grand Jury 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.387  Again, even if the constitutional 
issues are ignored, sound public policy reasons exist for redrafting 
this exception.388 
1. The Fifth Amendment Analysis 
To satisfy Fifth Amendment requirements, any disclosure of 
grand jury materials must be justified by a compelling necessity and 
be judicially supervised.389  The terrorism prevention exception 
authorizes disclosures that satisfy neither criterion.  This exception 
permits disclosure without judicial approval of 
any grand jury matter involving, within the United States or 
elsewhere, a threat of attack or other grave hostile acts of a 
foreign power or its agent, a threat of domestic or international 
sabotage or terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering 
activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power 
or by its agent, to any appropriate Federal, State, State 
subdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign government official, for the 
purpose of preventing or responding to such threat or activities.390 
Under the two-pronged compelling necessity test, the disclosure 
sought must be of a kind that serves an important societal interest,391 
and the need for disclosure must be shown with particularity.392  
 
 386 See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text. 
 387 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 388 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 389 See supra Part II.E. 
 390 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D). 
 391 See supra notes 273–79 and accompanying text. 
 392 See supra notes 280–96 and accompanying text. 
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Undoubtedly, the terrorism prevention exception satisfies the first 
prong of this test.  This exception is more narrowly drawn than the 
Patriot intelligence exception in one important respect—the Patriot 
intelligence exception permits the disclosure of information that 
does not relate to a direct threat of some type to the United States.393  
As discussed above,394 “foreign intelligence” could involve virtually any 
act by a noncitizen.  In contrast, the terrorism prevention exception 
for the most part focuses on activities, such as attack, sabotage, and 
terrorism, that involve a direct threat to public safety.395  Preventing 
such activities unquestionably serves a long-recognized societal 
interest.396 
However, the terrorism prevention exception fails to satisfy the 
second prong of the test, for it permits disclosure without a showing 
of particularized need.  Not every situation encompassed within the 
exception’s broad terms involves a real threat to public safety.  For 
instance, many actions could be disclosed under the undefined threat 
of “terrorism.”397  Naturally, the county sheriff needs to know that 
there are plans afoot to place a bomb in the county courthouse.  On 
the other hand, the county sheriff may not need to know that there 
are plans afoot for a peaceful protest within the courthouse.  This 
exception could easily become a tool used against those who might 
voice public dissent. 
Moreover, the exception permits disclosure to a wide range of 
officials, from the President of the United States to the mayor of a 
village in the middle of Tibet.398  The vital question of which officials 
possess a genuine need to know about a particular “threat” is far from 
clear.  As written, the terrorism prevention exception permits 
disclosure when no compelling need exists. 
Since the exception only became effective in December 2004 it is 
difficult to predict how it will be applied.399  Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(i) 
 
 393 See supra text accompanying notes 97–103. 
 394 See supra notes 100 & 334–35 and accompanying text. 
 395 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 396 Indeed, there have been rare occasions in our history when the Supreme 
Court was willing to sacrifice fundamental individual liberties on the altar of national 
security.  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (upholding 
wartime exclusion order by commanding general of Western Command, U.S. Army, 
“which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be 
excluded from [San Leandro, California, a military area]”). 
 397 See supra text accompanying notes 181–84. 
 398 See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text. 
 399 The Guidelines Regarding Disclosure to the Director of Central Intelligence 
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indicates that the Attorney General and the Director of National 
Intelligence will jointly issue guidelines governing the use of grand 
jury materials by state, foreign, and local officials pursuant to the 
Patriot intelligence and terrorism prevention exceptions.  This part 
of the rule, nevertheless, does not require the issuance of any 
guidelines governing the disclosure of such information.  Still, there 
is no reason to believe that the Attorney General will not follow the 
precedent set in the interpretation of the Patriot intelligence 
exception by making disclosure mandatory. 
The terrorism prevention exception also fails to satisfy the 
criterion that any disclosure be judicially supervised.400  The language 
of the exception permits prosecutors to act unilaterally.  If a 
substantial threat is imminent, the government’s interest in 
protecting national security may outweigh any right to grand jury 
secrecy.  In that case, unilateral action may be constitutionally 
permissible.  The language of the exception, however, permits 
unilateral action even in the absence of an imminent threat.  Despite 
a lack of purpose, the exception excludes judicial participation in the 
decision-making process.  As with the Patriot intelligence exception, 
the court is provided with nothing more than a vague, after-the-fact 
notice that “information” was disclosed to a particular department, 
agency, or entity.401  No meaningful role exists for the judiciary in this 
process.402 
The establishment of the terrorism prevention exception sets 
the stage for a material breach of the protection afforded grand jury 
secrecy by the Fifth Amendment.  Congress’ failure to require a 
showing of particularized need and to provide a meaningful role for 
the courts means that vast numbers of disclosures can and will be 
made.  Again, the cumulative effect of these disclosures will be to 
chill the participation of grand jury witnesses, and thereby cause 
systemic injury to the grand jury process.403 
 
and Homeland Security Officials of Foreign Intelligence Acquired in the Course of a 
Criminal Investigation released by Attorney General Ashcroft on Sept. 23, 2002, 
apply to information sharing under section 905(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act.  
Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, at 1.  Thus, under the terrorism prevention 
exception, these Guidelines do not apply to disclosures. 
 400 See supra Part II.E.2. 
 401 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(ii); supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 402 See supra text accompanying notes 199–202. 
 403 See generally supra notes 236–47 and accompanying text. 
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2. The Public Policy Analysis 
Even assuming that the terrorism prevention exception poses no 
constitutional problems, strong public policy arguments support its 
amendment.  In creating this exception, Congress took measures far 
beyond those necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of preventing 
and responding to threats to our national security.  Unnecessarily, 
Congress sacrificed the “public interest” in secrecy.404  Judicious 
amendment of the terrorism prevention exception could protect the 
doctrine of grand jury secrecy while furthering the goal of preventing 
and responding to national security threats. 
Few would disagree with Congress that, in some form, a 
terrorism prevention exception should exist—if information 
regarding a true threat to national security becomes known during a 
grand jury session, it should be disclosed to the proper authorities.  
Grand jury materials have been disclosed for lesser reasons.405  But in 
drafting the terrorism prevention exception, Congress made some 
critical mistakes.  First, it failed to set needed parameters in terms of 
the types of information that could be disclosed under the exception.  
Failing to define terms such as “terrorism”406 denies those seeking to 
apply the exception much-needed guidance and opens the doors to 
abuse.  It allows the disclosure of activities that do not pose any threat 
to national security. 
Second, Congress again created a system that places no checks 
on the executive branch’s power.  The judiciary lacks the ability to 
identify, much less prevent or punish any abuses of this exception.  
Further, “[s]ince the Department of Justice has taken the position 
that the intelligence committees of Congress should not be permitted 
to see any grand jury information, this means that there is no 
oversight of what use is made of grand jury material passed to the 
Intelligence Community.”407  Ironically, the same information that is 
 
 404 Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218–23 (1979); 
see also supra notes 9–28 and accompanying text, 39–46 and accompanying text, and 
Part II.C. 
 405 For instance, where a particularized need is established, grand jury materials 
may be disclosed for use in other civil and criminal proceedings. FED. R. CRIM. P. 
6(e)(3)(E)(i). 
 406 See supra notes 182–84, 397 and accompanying text. 
 407 SHELBY, S. REP. 107-351, supra note 373, at 60 n.123.  “The Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence tried to provide for such oversight in its FY03 
authorization bill, see S.2506 (107th Cong., 2d Sess.), at § 306, but this provision was 
removed in conference at the insistence of the Administration.”  Id. 
  
562 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:495 
 
 
entrusted to a foreign official may not be shared with the judicial or 
legislative branches of our own government. 
Certainly, some situations exist in which it would be 
impracticable to require prosecutors to seek judicial approval.  Of 
course, if a substantial and imminent threat exists a prosecutor may 
need to shout what he knows from the rooftops.  The law, naturally, 
should permit such disclosures.  But not every situation requires 
immediate disclosure.  Indeed, some situations do not require any 
disclosure.  At a minimum, prosecutors should be required to provide 
a list of those receiving information to the court.408 
Prosecutors and judges can and should work hand-in-hand to 
determine when the public’s interest in national security outweighs 
its interest in grand jury secrecy.  The prosecutor should identify 
information that may evidence a threat and immediately bring that 
information to the court’s attention.  The court should quickly weigh 
all of the competing interests and determine whether disclosure is 
warranted and the conditions under which it should be made.  
Weighing the interests involved benefits all concerned.  Grand jury 
targets are not the only parties who have a strong interest in a grand 
jury system that protects against unwarranted disclosures.409  Both the 
public and the government have an interest in maintaining a system 
in which grand jury witnesses freely step forward and testify “fully and 
frankly,” and in which targets are not given the opportunity to flee or 
intimidate witnesses or jurors.410  Secrecy is necessary to the discovery 
of the truth. 
While the Bush Administration has fought hard to create the 
new exceptions to the rule of secrecy, it too apparently recognizes the 
value of secrecy.  In early 2003, the Administration reportedly floated 
legislation that would amend Rule 6(e) yet again to tighten the rule 
of secrecy.411  Section 206 of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act 
of 2003 would have, in certain circumstances, required secrecy with 
respect to grand jury witnesses.412  Although, for the time being, this 
 
 408 See supra notes 381–83 and accompanying text. 
 409 See supra notes 236–47 and accompanying text; Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 218 
(finding that “the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the 
secrecy of grand jury proceedings”). 
 410 Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 219. 
 411 Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, “PATRIOT ACT II”, at 
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/PA2draft.html#Sec206summ (draft Jan. 9, 
2003). 
 412 Id.  Specifically, the description of section 206, entitled “Grand Jury 
Information in Terrorism Cases” states: 
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proposal now appears to have been dropped,413 it evidences the vital 
role of secrecy in the grand jury system. 
Another person with a substantial interest in maintaining grand 
jury secrecy is the grand jury witness.  Under the terrorism prevention 
exception as written, no one protects the interests of the witness.  No 
one is charged with considering whether disclosing a witness’ 
testimony might place that witness, or a relative in a different 
country, in danger.  The danger of intimidation, injury, or even death 
should not be taken lightly—grand jury tampering does occur.414  
Judicial supervision of any proposed disclosure is necessary to protect 
grand jury witnesses from harm. 
Judicial supervision may even further the goal of obtaining 
helpful intelligence information from grand jury witnesses.  If the 
public begins to perceive grand juries as the tool of the intelligence 
community, revealing anything and everything, witnesses may 
withhold important information out of fear.  Limiting disclosures to 
materials involving truly vital information may actually help in the 
acquisition of such information.  It is indisputable that it might be 
more convenient for the Justice Department to act unilaterally in 
making the decision to disclose, but “‘doubtless all arbitrary powers, 
well executed, are the most convenient.’”415  “‘[Y]et let it be again 
remembered that delays and little inconveniences in the forms of 
 
This section amends Rule 6(e)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to make witnesses and persons to whom subpoenas are 
directed subject to grand jury secrecy rules in cases where serious 
adverse consequences may otherwise result, including danger to the 
national security or to the life or physical safety of an individual, flight 
from prosecution, destruction of or tampering with evidence, 
intimidation of a potential witness, or other serious jeopardy to an 
investigation.  The provision would permit witnesses and recipients of 
grand jury subpoenas to consult with counsel regarding the subpoena 
and any testimony, but would impose the same secrecy obligations on 
counsel. 
Id. 
 413 See Bob Egelko, Bush, Kerry Divided on Scope of Patriot Act; President Says Expand, 
Rival Says Reduce, S.F. CHRON., Sep. 20, 2004, at A1. 
 414 In the late 1970’s the General Accounting Office (GAO) documented “343 
[grand jury] witnesses who had their identities revealed before any indictments were 
returned by grand juries, including 5 who were murdered, 10 who were intimidated, 
and 1 who disappeared.”  GAO REP. TO CONG.: MORE GUIDANCE AND SUPERVISION 
NEEDED OVER FEDERAL GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS 6 (1980).  Since the GAO studied 
only a few of the federal districts, these numbers represent only “the tip of the 
iceberg.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 415 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 545 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 350). 
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justice are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in 
more substantial matters.’”416  Based on the foregoing, Congress was 
correct in reviving the terrorism prevention exception, but erred in 
failing to protect the secrecy that is essential to grand jury 
proceedings. 
 
 416 Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 349, 350). 
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IV. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 6(E)417 
 
 417 As of January 18, 2005, Rule 6(e)(2), (3) read: 
(e) Recording and Disclosing the Proceedings. 
. . . . 
 (2) Secrecy. 
 (A) No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person 
except in accordance with Rule 6(e)(2)(B). 
 (B) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following persons 
must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury: 
 (i) a grand juror; 
 (ii) an interpreter; 
 (iii) a court reporter; 
 (iv) an operator of a recording device; 
 (v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony; 
 (vi) an attorney for the government; or 
 (vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule 
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii); 
 (3) Exceptions. 
 (A) Disclosure of a grand-jury matter—other than the grand jury’s 
deliberations or any grand juror’s vote—may be made to: 
 (i) an attorney for the government for use in performing that 
attorney’s duty; 
 (ii) any government personnel—including those of a state, state 
subdivision, Indian tribe, or foreign government—that an attorney for 
the government considers necessary to assist in performing that 
attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law; or 
 (iii) a person authorized by 18 U.S.C. §  3322. 
 (B) A person to whom information is disclosed under Rule 
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) may use that information only to assist an attorney for 
the government in performing that attorney’s duty to enforce federal 
criminal law.  An attorney for the government must promptly provide 
the court that impaneled the grand jury with the names of all persons 
to whom a disclosure has been made, and must certify that the attorney 
has advised those persons of their obligation of secrecy under this rule. 
 (C) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury 
matter to another federal grand jury. 
 (D) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury 
matter involving foreign intelligence, counterintelligence (as defined 
in 50 U.S.C. §  401a), or foreign intelligence information (as defined in 
Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(iii)) to any federal law enforcement, intelligence, 
protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official 
to assist the official receiving the information in the performance of 
that official’s duties.  An attorney for the government may also disclose 
any grand jury matter involving, within the United States or elsewhere, 
a threat of attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or its 
agent, a threat of domestic or international sabotage or terrorism, or 
clandestine intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service 
or network of a foreign power or by its agent, to any appropriate 
Federal, State, State subdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign government 
official, for the purpose of preventing or responding to such threat or 
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activities. 
 (i) Any official who receives information under Rule 6(e)(3)(D) 
may use the information only as necessary in the conduct of that 
person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized 
disclosure of such information.  Any State, State subdivision, Indian 
tribal, or foreign government official who receives information under 
Rule 6(e)(3)(D) may use the information only consistent with such 
guidelines as the Attorney General and the Director of National 
Intelligence shall jointly issue. 
 (ii) Within a reasonable time after disclosure is made under 
Rule 6(e)(3)(D), an attorney for the government must file, under seal, 
a notice with the court in the district where the grand jury convened 
stating that such information was disclosed and the departments, 
agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made. 
 (iii) As used in Rule 6(e)(3)(D), the term “foreign intelligence 
information” means: 
 (a) information, whether or not it concerns a United States 
person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect 
against— 
actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power 
or its agent; 
sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or its agent; or 
clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network 
of a foreign power or by its agent; or 
 (b) information, whether or not it concerns a United States 
person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates 
to— 
the national defense or the security of the United States; or 
the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. 
 (E) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a manner, 
and subject to any other conditions that it directs—of a grand-jury 
matter: 
 (i) preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding; 
 (ii) at the request of a defendant who shows that a ground may 
exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred 
before the grand jury; 
 (iii) at the request of the government, when sought by a foreign 
court or prosecutor for use in an official criminal investigation; 
 (iv) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter 
may disclose a violation of State, Indian tribal, or foreign criminal law, 
as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate state, state-subdivision, 
Indian tribal, or foreign government official for the purpose of 
enforcing that law; or 
 (v) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter 
may disclose a violation of military criminal law under the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate 
military official for the purpose of enforcing that law. 
 (F) A petition to disclose a grand-jury matter under Rule 
6(e)(3)(E)(i) must be filed in the district where the grand jury 
convened.  Unless the hearing is ex parte—as it may be when the 
government is the petitioner—the petitioner must serve the petition 
on, and the court must afford a reasonable opportunity to appear and 
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To address the concerns outlined above, I propose that Congress 
amend Rule 6(e)(2), (3) to read:418 
(e) Recording and Disclosing the Proceedings. 
. . . . 
 (2) Secrecy. 
  (A) No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person 
except in accordance with Rule 6(e)(2)(B). 
  (B) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following 
persons must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand 
jury: 
   (i) a grand juror; 
   (ii) an interpreter; 
   (iii) a court reporter; 
 
be heard to: 
 (i) an attorney for the government; 
 (ii) the parties to the judicial proceeding; and 
 (iii) any other person whom the court may designate. 
 (G) If the petition to disclose arises out of a judicial proceeding in 
another district, the petitioned court must transfer the petition to the 
other court unless the petitioned court can reasonably determine 
whether disclosure is proper.  If the petitioned court decides to 
transfer, it must send to the transferee court the material sought to be 
disclosed, if feasible, and a written evaluation of the need for 
continued grand jury secrecy.  The transferee court must afford those 
persons identified in Rule 6(e)(3)(F) a reasonable opportunity to 
appear and be heard. 
 (4) Sealed Indictment.  The magistrate judge to whom an indictment is 
returned may direct that the indictment be kept secret until the 
defendant is in custody or has been released pending trial.  The clerk 
must then seal the indictment, and no person may disclose the 
indictment’s existence except as necessary to issue or execute a warrant 
or summons. 
  (5) Closed Hearing.  Subject to any right to an open hearing in a 
contempt proceeding, the court must close any hearing to the extent 
necessary to prevent disclosure of a matter occurring before a grand 
jury. 
  (6) Sealed Records.  Records, orders, and subpoenas relating to grand-
jury proceedings must be kept under seal to the extent and as long as 
necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of a matter occurring 
before a grand jury. 
  (7) Contempt.  A knowing violation of Rule 6, or of guidelines jointly 
issued by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
Intelligence pursuant to Rule 6, may be punished as a contempt of 
court. 
 418 The substantive changes are underlined. 
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   (iv) an operator of a recording device; 
   (v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony; 
   (vi) an attorney for the government; or 
   (vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule 
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii); 
 (3) Exceptions. 
  (A) Disclosure of a grand jury matter—other than the 
grand jury’s deliberations or any grand juror’s vote—may be 
made to: 
   (i) an attorney for the government for use in performing 
that attorney’s duty; 
   (ii) any government personnel—including those of a 
state or state subdivision or of an Indian tribe—that an attorney 
for the government considers necessary to assist in performing 
that attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law; or 
   (iii) a person authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3322. 
  (B) A person to whom information is disclosed under Rule 
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) may use that information only to assist an attorney 
for the government in performing that attorney’s duty to enforce 
federal criminal law. An attorney for the government must 
promptly provide the court that impaneled the grand jury with 
the names of all persons to whom a disclosure has been made, 
and must certify that the attorney has advised those persons of 
their obligation of secrecy under this rule. 
  (C) An attorney for the government may disclose any 
grand-jury matter to another federal grand jury. 
  (D) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand 
jury matter when the matter involves information that he or she 
reasonably believes may evidence an imminent, substantial threat 
to the United States homeland, its critical infrastructure, its key 
resources (whether physical or electronic), or its persons or 
interests worldwide, to any appropriate federal, state, local, or 
foreign government official for the purpose of preventing or 
responding to such a threat. 
   (i) Any official who receives information under Rule 
6(e)(3)(D) may use that information only as necessary in the 
conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations 
on the unauthorized disclosure of such information. 
   (ii) Any state, local, or foreign official who receives 
information pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(D) shall use that 
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information only consistent with such guidelines as the Attorney 
General and Director of National Intelligence shall jointly issue. 
   (iii) After a disclosure made pursuant to Rule 
6(e)(3)(D), an attorney for the government must promptly 
provide the court with a notice containing the names of all 
persons to whom a disclosure has been made, a brief description 
of the information disclosed and the reason for the disclosure, 
and a certification that the attorney has advised such persons of 
any obligation of secrecy under this rule or any applicable 
guidelines.  This notice shall be filed under seal. 
  (E) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a 
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—of a 
grand-jury matter preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial 
proceeding. 
  (F) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a 
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—at the 
request of a defendant who shows that a ground may exist to 
dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred before 
the grand jury. 
  (G) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a 
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—at the 
request of the government if it shows that the matter may disclose 
a violation of state or Indian tribal criminal law, as long as the 
disclosure is to an appropriate state, state-subdivision, or Indian 
tribal official for the purpose of enforcing that law. 
  (H) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a 
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—at the 
request of the government if it shows that the matter may disclose 
a violation of military criminal law under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate 
military official for the purpose of enforcing that law. 
  (I) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a 
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—at the 
request of the government if it shows that the matter involves 
information that may evidence a substantial threat to the United 
States homeland, its critical infrastructure, its key resources 
(whether physical or electronic), or its persons or interests 
worldwide, or it shows that such matters involve clandestine 
intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service or 
network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power, 
within the United States or elsewhere, to any appropriate federal, 
state, local, or foreign government official for the purpose of 
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preventing or responding to such a threat or such activities. 
   (i) Any official who receives information under Rule 
6(e)(3)(I) may use that information only as necessary in the 
conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations 
on the unauthorized disclosure of such information. 
   (ii) In addition to any conditions imposed by the court, 
any state, local, or foreign official who receives information 
pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(I) may use that information only 
consistent with such guidelines as the Attorney General and 
Director of National Intelligence shall jointly issue. 
  (J) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a 
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—at the 
request of the government if it shows that such matters involve 
significant foreign intelligence, counterintelligence (as defined in 
50 U.S.C. §  401a), or foreign intelligence information (as defined 
in Rule 6(e)(3)(J)(ii)) to any federal law enforcement, 
intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or 
national security official to assist the official receiving the 
information in the performance of that official’s duties. 
   (i) Any federal official who receives information under 
Rule 6(e)(3)(J) may use the information only as necessary in the 
conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations 
on the unauthorized disclosure of such information. 
   (ii) As used in Rule 6(e)(3)(J), the term “foreign 
intelligence information” means: 
    (a) information, whether or not it concerns a United 
States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to 
protect against— 
    • actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts 
of a foreign power or its agent; 
    • sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign 
power or its agent; or 
    • clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence 
service or network of a foreign power or by its agent; or 
    (b) information, whether or not it concerns a United 
States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory 
that relates to— 
    • the national defense or the security of the United 
States; or 
    • the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United 
States. 
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  (K) A petition to disclose a grand jury matter under Rule 
6(e)(3)(E) must be filed in the district where the grand jury 
convened.  Unless the hearing is ex parte—as it may be when the 
government is the petitioner—the petitioner must serve the 
petition on, and the court must afford a reasonable opportunity 
to appear and be heard to: 
   (i) an attorney for the government; 
   (ii) the parties to the judicial proceeding; and 
   (iii) any other person whom the court may designate. 
  (L) If the petition to disclose arises out of a judicial 
proceeding in another district, the petitioned court must transfer 
the petition to the other court unless the petitioned court can 
reasonably determine whether disclosure is proper. If the 
petitioned court decides to transfer, it must send to the transferee 
court the material sought to be disclosed, if feasible, and a written 
evaluation of the need for continued grand jury secrecy. The 
transferee court must afford those persons identified in Rule 
6(e)(3)(K) a reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard. 
  (M) In Rule 6(e)(3)(D) and Rule 6(e)(3)(I), 
   (i)  the term “substantial threat” means a threat of actual 
or potential attack or other grave hostile acts by a foreign power 
or an agent of a foreign power, sabotage (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2152–2156), domestic or international terrorism (as defined in 
18 U.S.C. § 2331), or use of weapons of mass destruction; 
   (ii) the term  “information” as it relates to “a threat of 
actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts by a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power” means all information 
relating  to the existence, organization, capabilities, 
communications, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of 
finance or material support, or activities of a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power relating to such threat, or to the same 
information relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed 
to be assisting or associated with them; 
   (iii) the term “information” as it relates to a threat of 
“sabotage” means all information relating to the existence, 
organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means 
of finance or material support, or activities of saboteurs or threats 
posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, its 
persons, or its interests or those of other associate nations (as 
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2151), or to communications between such 
groups or individuals, or to the same information relating to 
groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or 
  
572 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:495 
 
 
associated with them; 
   (iv) the term “information” as it relates to a threat of 
“domestic or international terrorism” means all information 
relating to the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, 
intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, 
or activities of foreign, international, or domestic terrorist groups 
or individuals, or threats posed by such groups or individuals to 
the United States, United States persons, or United States 
interests, or those of other nations, or to communications 
between such groups or individuals, or to the same information 
relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed to be 
assisting or associated with them; 
   (v) the term “information” as it relates to a threat of “use 
of weapons of mass destruction” means all information relating to 
conventional explosive weapons and non-conventional weapons 
capable of causing mass casualties and damage, including 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents and 
weapons and the means of delivery of such weapons. 
  (N) A petition for disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(I) or 
Rule 6(e)(3)(J) shall be ruled upon by the judge designated in 
subparagraph (O)(i) within forty-eight (48) hours of its filing.  
Any review of a denial of such a petition shall be conducted as 
expeditiously as possible. 
  (O) A notice of disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(D) or a 
petition for disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(I) or Rule 
6(e)(3)(J) shall be filed in the district where the grand jury 
convened. 
   (i)  The Chief Judge for each district shall designate one 
judge serving within the district and one alternate to review such 
notices and hear such petitions for a term of three years.  If a 
petition is denied, the court shall immediately provide for the 
record a written statement of each reason for its decision.  On 
motion of the United States, the record shall be transmitted, 
under seal, to the court of review established in Rule 
6(e)(3)(O)(ii). 
   (ii)  The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court shall publicly designate three judges, one of whom shall be 
publicly designated as the presiding judge, from each United 
States Court of Appeals who together shall comprise a court of 
review which shall have jurisdiction to review the denial of any 
petition within its Circuit under these subdivisions.  If a court of 
review determines that the application was properly denied, the 
court shall immediately provide for the record a written statement 
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of each reason for its decision and, on petition of the United 
States for a writ of certiorari, the record shall be transmitted 
under seal to the Supreme Court, which shall have jurisdiction to 
review such decision. 
   (iii)  The record of proceedings under Rule 6(e)(3)(O) 
including notices filed, petitions made, and orders granted, shall 
be maintained under security measures established by the Chief 
Justice in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director 
of Central Intelligence. 
This amendment would preserve the best features of the Patriot 
intelligence exception, the terrorism prevention exception, and the 
information-sharing guidelines issued by the Attorney General.  It 
recognizes the need and right of prosecutors to share grand jury 
materials relating to substantial threats to the United States and its 
people.  The pre-September 11th version of Rule 6(e) was lacking in 
that it failed to provide for situations in which the need for secrecy is 
outweighed by a need to protect against terrorism and other hostile 
acts.419  Congress did not err in seeking to rectify this flaw.  Congress 
did err in completely excluding the courts from the decision-making 
process and ignoring society’s interest in grand jury secrecy.  
Proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(D) allows prosecutors to act unilaterally when 
an imminent, substantial threat exists.  The definitions in Rule 
6(e)(3)(M) should help prosecutors identify the types of situations in 
which this power should be invoked.  Conversely, the reporting 
requirement in proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(iii) should guard against 
prosecutorial abuse. 
When no imminent threat exists, the proposed amendment 
affords courts the opportunity to undertake the traditional, 
constitutional balancing analysis to determine whether a 
particularized need for disclosure exists and whether that need 
outweighs society’s interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy.420  
Proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(I) permits judicially-approved disclosure of 
substantial threats to the nation’s security,421 and proposed Rule 
6(e)(3)(J) permits judicially-approved disclosure of significant 
 
 419 The omission of an exception for the disclosure of intelligence information is 
understandable.  Warfare has changed dramatically.  Until recently, it was 
unimaginable that the United States would face terrorist attacks on the home front. 
 420 See supra Part II.E. 
 421 Proposed Rules 6(e)(3)(D) and 6(e)(3)(I) replace the terrorism prevention 
exception. 
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intelligence information.422 
Rule 6(e)(3)(O) provides for the appointment of a special judge 
within each district and a special panel within each circuit to handle 
notices and petitions filed pursuant to the new exceptions.  Not only 
does the appointment of this special court permit heightened 
security, it also creates a corps of judges with special expertise in this 
area.423  To facilitate an expedited response, Rule 6(e)(3)(N) requires 
a decision within forty-eight hours of the filing of a petition.  In short, 
the proposed amendment would protect national security interests 
without destroying the secrecy so crucial to grand jury functioning. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In creating the Patriot intelligence exception and the terrorism 
prevention exception, Congress acted with the honorable intention 
of avoiding further terrorist atrocities on American soil.  But in the 
words of Justice Brandeis: 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect 
liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent.  Men 
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their 
liberty by evil-minded rulers.  The greatest dangers to liberty lurk 
in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but 
without understanding.424 
In its zeal to bolster our national security, Congress passed laws that 
endanger our liberty.  Both the Patriot intelligence exception and the 
terrorism prevention exception violate the Grand Jury Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.425  Constitutional questions aside, public policy 
concerns caution against needlessly destroying grand jury secrecy.426  
By itself, doing away with grand jury secrecy would probably not bring 
the Republic to its knees.  But the destruction of this right must not 
be viewed in isolation.  With one stroke of the presidential pen, 
Americans arguably lost a right older than the nation itself.  In times 
of national crisis, we must be even more vigilant in protecting the 
basic rights on which our nation was built.  By revisiting Rule 6(e), 
Congress can draft a rule that strengthens national security while 
preserving the grand jury system.  The goals of liberty and security 
 
 422 Proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(J) replaces the Patriot intelligence exception. 
 423 Such judges should be provided with specialized training. 
 424 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 425 See supra Part III.A.1 & Part III.B.1. 
 426 See supra Part III.A.2 & Part III.B.2. 
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should not be viewed as mutually exclusive. 
 
